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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 120 years have passed since the states ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment, making equal protection of the laws a constitu-
tional right for all citizens. Since the Amendment's passage, courts and
academics have struggled to define exactly what government actions are
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.1 Courts and scholars gener-
ally have understood equality to mean that similar groups should be
treated similarly.2 This definition recognizes that differences exist be-
tween people and that ensuring that all people are treated equally in
spite of these differences would inhibit progress. The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has not interpreted the Clause to require that
the government always treat similar groups similarly due to concerns
that this requirement would stymie government activity.' Rather, the
Court has said that it will invalidate a government action under the
Equal Protection Clause only when the government has displayed un-
fair and unequal treatment toward an identifiable group and when cer-
tain suspicious circumstances indicate the government did not have
good reason to do so.4
In the 1970s, the Court developed the discriminatory intent stan-
dard to narrow the class of suspicious circumstances that would invoke
the Clause's protection. The intent standard requires plaintiffs to show
that the state's act disparately affected them and that the act was moti-
vated by discriminatory intent. Otherwise, the Court would merely ex-
amine whether the state had a rational basis for its actions, virtually
assuring that the challenge would fail.
The discriminatory intent standard is based in part on the idea
that racial discrimination is conscious, willful, and morally reprehensi-
1. Many core government acts necessarily involve shifting rights or privileges from one party
to another, thus treating them unequally. See, for example, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248
(1976) (noting that "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes
... may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white").
2. See Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif.
L. Rev. 341, 344 (1949): "The measure of the reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its
success in treating similarly those similarly situated."
3. For example, the court has stated:
[N]either the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment... nor any other amendment, was designed to
interfere with the power of the State . . . to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
4. Over time, the Court has changed what it considers to be suspicious circumstances. Com-
pare Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) (saying the primary focus in equal
protection cases is whether the governmental act had a discriminatory effect), with Washington,
426 U.S. at 240 (saying the essential element in equal protection cases is whether the government
had a discriminatory purpose).
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ble.5 Current studies of the dynamics of racism, however, demonstrate
that this understanding of racial discrimination is incomplete: many
people learn racist attitudes early in life and unconsciously use them to
process information about their environment and to decide how to act.6
This type of racism has been described as "aversive racism."'7 Aversive
racists consciously know that racism is wrong, yet their cognitive devel-
opment essentially has predisposed them to make decisions based on
racist beliefs anyway. The result is that aversive racists take conscious
steps to avoid racism within themselves, yet their unconscious prejudg-
ments still influence their decisions. Actors motivated by aversive ra-
cism, therefore, may discriminate against a target racial group without
consciously intending to do so.
Additionally, scholars now understand that racism may operate on
an institutional as well as individual level." Institutional racism occurs
when the group in power structures its social institutions so as to main-
tain its dominance over other groups.9
This Note examines aversive, institutional racism for the purpose
of determining whether new understandings about racism require a
modification of equal protection analysis. To illustrate the causes and
effects of institutional racism, this Note focuses on situations in which a
government.body sites an environmental hazard in or near a neighbor-
hood with a high percentage of minority residents. Statistics show that
a substantial correlation exists between the racial make-up of a neigh-
borhood and the likelihood that an environmental hazard will be lo-
cated nearby.10  Some scholars have termed this phenomenon
"environmental racism," even though these instances often lack any ev-
idence of conscious discriminatory intent on the part of the deci-
sionmakers. To a person who believes that conscious intent is a
necessary component of racial discrimination, it may seem more likely
that economic factors, rather than racial prejudices, motivate decisions
to place environmental hazards in minority neighborhoods.1' Further-
5. See note 146.
6. See the discussion in Part II.A.
7. The conscious type of racism that concerns the Supreme Court-called "dominative ra-
cism"-has become increasingly less common in America for a variety of socioeconomic and politi-
cal reasons. See the discussion in Part H.C.
8. See Part lI.B.
9. This action may be motivated by the in-group's desire to stay on top or by the in-group's
commitment to a moral-based ideology that dictates that the in-group is morally superior to other
groups. In either case, institutions reflect the racist tendencies of all the members of the society.
Thus, institutional discrimination may manifest both dominative and aversive tendencies. See the
discussion in Part II.B.
10. See authorities cited in notes 168-69.
11. For example, since property values in minority neighborhoods are often low, the costs of
polluting in these areas will be low as well. Since the marginal costs of pollution control will likely
1993] 939
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more, to the extent that racial discrimination could influence these de-
cisions, many states and counties have procedural safeguards to protect
neighborhoods chosen to host environmental hazards. 12 This Note will
address these arguments and show that they rest on flawed assump-
tions. In many cases, these economic or procedural protections may be
illusory.'3 If racism does in fact drive the phenomenon that minorities
bear a disproportionate share of the risk associated with environmental
hazards, the courts should modify the equal protection analysis to pro-
hibit insidious as well as invidious discrimination.
Part II of this Note examines the concept of racism, how it exists in
the unconscious, and how it manifests itself as apparently rational be-
havior. Part III briefly sketches the development of equal protection
jurisprudence and demonstrates how and why the Supreme Court de-
veloped its intent-based approach to equal protection. This Part also
explains how the intent standard manifests a misunderstanding of ra-
cism. Part IV uses environmental racism to illustrate the inadequacy of
the intent standard. This Part draws on the discussions in Part II to
demonstrate how racist influences operate in a specific institutional
framework and how intent inadequately measures racial discrimination
in such cases. Part V suggests ways that the courts could adapt equal
protection jurisprudence to redress true instances of institutional ra-
cism without handcuffing legislative bodies.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RACISM
Racism in its most basic sense is the manifestation of a person's
tendency to attach significance to an individual's race. 4 Accordingly,
exceed the benefits, polluting in poor neighborhoods may be the most cost-efficient option availa-
ble. See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity and
Efficiency, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 871, 873 (1992) (presenting this as the welfare economics argument).
Also, environmental hazards such as trash incinerators and toxic waste facilities may provide jobs
in low-income neighborhoods, making these areas logical hosts because they stand to benefit from
the facility. Finally, some states allow a host neighborhood to approve or reject a siting proposal.
This usually means the neighborhood may receive financial inducements from the the entity seek-
ing to build the hazardous facility. See notes 205-14 and accompanying text. For discussion of the
economic "logic" behind burdening the poor with environmental hazards, see Pollution and the
Poor: Why "Clean Development" at Any Price is a Curse on the Third World, The Economist 18
(Feb. 15, 1992).
12. See the discussion in Part IV.B.
13. See the discussion in Part IV.
14. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1987). See also Gerald Torres, Introduction: Under-
standing Environmental Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 839, 840 (1992) (defining racism as "those
activities which support or justify the superiority of one racial group over another"); Joel Kovel,
White Racism: A Psychohistory 3 (Columbia, 1984) (describing racism as "a set of beliefs whose
structure arises from the deepest levels of our lives.., and from the patterns of our fundamental
social activities"); Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley, 1954) (describ-
[Vol. 46:937
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racism operates in the following way: Whites and minorities, con-
sciously or unconsciously, are influenced by notions that whites are su-
perior to nonwhites and that nonwhites are more like animated things
than full-fledged human beings.'5 Having recharacterized the nonwhite
in nonhuman terms, a person influenced by racism may then justify
mistreating nonwhites without feeling the guilt or empathy that nor-
mally accompanies harming a fellow human being.1
6
ing racism as the process of labelling a person on the basis of that person's most prominent fea-
ture); James M. Jones, Prejudice and Racism 172 (Addison-Wesley, 1972) (saying that "[r]acism
results from the transformation of race prejudice and/or ethnocentrism through the exercise of
power against a racial group defined as inferior, by individuals and institutions with the inten-
tional or unintentional support of the entire culture").
The term "racism" connotes a great deal of negative and value-laden impressions that this
Note wishes to avoid. This Note does not treat racism as a morally reprehensible personal choice,
but as the result of social cognitive learning processes. For an individual to process and understand
her environment, she must use cognitive shortcuts called stereotypes. These stereotypes are often
exaggerations, oversimplifications and generalizations, yet people accept them as fact for purposes
of making judgments about new situations. See William B. Helmreich, The Things They Say Be-
hind Your Back 2 (Transaction Books, 1984). While unconscious racial stereotyping can cause
severe injury to others, it constitutes only a fraction of the mostly harmless stereotyping that peo-
ple employ to understand their surroundings. As such this Note considers racism an extremely
harmful social and political condition that should be eradicated without the use of moral-based
rhetoric. Racism is not undesirable because it is wrong for people to feel racist; it is undesirable
because of the harm it causes to others. One who believes that racial stereotyping is evil or aberra-
tional fundamentally misunderstands the dynamics of racism and encourages people to bury their
racist tendencies deeper in their unconscious, further entrenching the problem in society. "There is
an emotional punch to calling someone a racist .... Willingness to use such labels can intimidate
some opponents into silence." Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const'l
Comm. 395, 402 (1991). Accordingly, racism must be neutralized as a concept before society can
expect to address it realistically.
15. See Kovel, White Racism at 36 (cited in note 14). Kovel argues that the dehumanization
of nonwhites often takes the form of myth-like "symbolic fantasies"-delusions that members of
other races are not human-which justify racial discrimination and hatred. Id. at 82. He observes:
"What counts to men is what their symbolic apparatus can seize upon; and nothing is more evident
than the blackness of black skin (even if it really is brown)." Id. at 82-83. As an example of a
symbolic fantasy based upon skin color, Kovel offers the white myth that blacks are dirty and
smelly people. Id. at 83. See also Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power 68
(Harper & Row, 1967) (noting that blacks are portrayed as "animal-like and brutish in their appe-
tites"); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black 31 (Penguin, 1969) (noting the suspicion in Eliza-
bethan England that Africans committed bestial acts with monkeys). See generally Helmreich, The
Things They Say Behind Your Back at 59-91 (detailing common stereotypes about blacks).
For a discussion of how members of a minority group may be influenced by notions that their
group is inferior to whites, see notes 160 and 163.
16. See Kovel, White Racism at 83. The degree of mistreatment or negative sentiment ac-
cordingly seems to correspond to the decrease of human value suggested by the symbolic fantasy.
For example, several advocates of genocide have used metaphors of filth and disease to
recharacterize the objects of their racism in nonhuman terms. For example, Adolph Hitler de-
scribed the Jews as "suffering from a poisonous infection" and "desir[ing] to infect others with the
same disease." Richard A. Koenigsberg, The Psychoanalysis of Racism, Revolution, and National-
ism 13-14 (Library of Social Science, 1977). Similarly, one of Josef Stalin's assistants justified the
1930s purge in the Soviet Union by describing it as "cutting into good flesh in order to get rid of
the bad." Id. at 15. Koenigsberg points out that disease metaphors are part of a symbolic fantasy
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The notion that nonwhites are less than human often takes the
form of stereotypes. 17 For example, opponents to racial integration of
the public education system in middle-class white suburban neighbor-
hoods say they do not want their children subjected to bad influ-
ences-crime, juvenile delinquency, drug addiction and teenage
pregnancy."' While the concern for the moral environment in the
schools may be legitimate, the proposed exclusionary solution is based
on the principle that blacks are necessarily linked to these bad influ-
ences and, therefore, exposure to blacks would create a bad influence on
white children.1 9
A. The Dynamics of Individual Racism: Dominative and Aversive
Types
Social cognitive psychologists have found that racist beliefs can de-
velop early in a person's life and become deeply rooted in their minds.
People learn negative stereotypes about other races and ethnicities as
children.2 0 These lessons are critical to a child's development because
they help her form a sense of identity-that is, they help her develop
notions of self and others. 2' The interrelationship between self-identity,
social-identity and racial beliefs is so complex that a person's beliefs
that has as a goal the active eradication of a certain race from society. As such, they represent
extremist dominative racist tendencies.
In contrast, aversive symbolic fantasies are considerably milder. For example, the symbolic
fantasy that blacks are poor because they are lazier than whites, Helmreich, The Things They Say
Behind Your Back at 59-91, would support a decision not to hire a black worker, but would not
support genocide.
17. Stereotypes may result from a cognitive process called "projection," whereby an individ-
ual accuses others bf negative motives or feelings she senses in herself but cannot express openly.
Helmreich, The Things They Say Behind Your Back at 4 (attributing this theory to Professors
Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz). They allow the individual to rationalize the mistreatment
of another racial, ethnic or cultural group. Id. Stereotypes are comforting in that they provide a
sense of group continuity, tradition and an easy way to understand and categorize other people
without having to get to know them too deeply. Kovel, White Racism at 212-13 (cited in note 14).
See the discussion in notes 14 and 16.
18. Senate Select Committee Hearing on Equal Educational Opportunity, Part 5; De Facto
Segregation and Housing Discrimination 2966 (Sept. 1, 1970) (comments of Anthony Downs). The
unstated goal behind this stereotype would be to avoid contact with blacks. This example appro-
priately would be described as an instance of aversive racism. See Part II.A.
19. Even young children may possess racist symbolic fantasies. A 1940s study of 103 four-
year-olds, white and black, showed a common belief that whites were better than blacks, in part
because they were not as dirty as blacks. Mary Ellen Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Chil-
dren 37-38, 46 (Addison-Wesley, 1952).
20. William A. Barnard and Mark S. Benn, Belief Congruence and Prejudice Reduction in
an Interracial Contact Setting, 128 J. Soc. Psych. 125, 126 (1988); Donn Byrne and Terry J.
Wong, Racial Prejudice, Interpersonal Attraction, and Assumed Dissimilarity of Attitudes, 65 J.
Abnormal & Soc. Psych. 246, 251-52 (1962).
21. See Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Children at 19-21, 24. Professor Lawrence has
argued that "[i]ndividuals learn cultural attitudes and beliefs about race very early in life, at a
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about different races, once learned, are highly resistant to change. Be-
cause a person's sense of self-worth is intertwined with her sense of self-
and social-identity, the resistance of these ideas to change is generally
desirable from a stability standpoint. A successful challenge to a per-
son's racial stereotypes could require a devastating reordering of her
entire self-perception.
Cognitive psychologists further explain that learning processes are
facilitated by the development of schemas-mental constructs that fa-
cilitate the processing of new, unfamiliar stimuli by comparing them to
familiar ones and drawing conclusions about the new based on what the
person knows about the familiar.2 2 Once a person matches a new situa-
tion with a familiar one, she will then begin to react to the new situa-
tion according to how she would react to the familiar one. In
constructing a schema, a person will take cues from those who seem
more knowledgeable about the situation.2 Absent better evidence to
the contrary, the person often will conform to the beliefs and attitudes
of these "experts. ' 24 Since young children seldom will have "better evi-
dence" about other races and ethnicities than what their elders tell
them, parents, schoolteachers and others close to the child have tre-
mendous influence. 5
Of course, parents and schoolteachers are not morally culpable for
perpetuating racism in this country. Sometimes they have facilitated
the construction of racist schemas in children while carrying out so-
cially beneficial functions. For example, society places great value on
teaching history and patriotism to children, therefore, American and
European history courses are part of nearly all elementary school cur-
ricula. Schoolteachers (and conscientious parents) bear the responsibil-
ity for teaching children history. A recurring lesson in these history
courses is the domination of nonwhite groups by whites: whites con-
quered the American Indians and Mexicans; they enslaved the Africans;
and they have devastated the land in several East Asian countries. 6 As
time when it is difficult to separate the perceptions of one's teacher (usually a parent) from one's
own." Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 337-38 (cited in note 14).
22. See Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 98 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed.
1991); Hazel Markus, Self-Schemata and Processing Information About the Self, 35 J. Personality
and Soc. Psych. 63 (1977).
23. See Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice 108 (Scott, Foresman, 2d ed.
1987); Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory 47
(Prentice-Hall, 1986).
24. Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 73, 96 & nn.92-93 (1993).
25. David Milner, Children and Race 55-62 (Sage, 1983).
26. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Cul-
ture, 77 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 1992).
19931
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children become familiar with these basic historical realities, they draw
the seemingly logical conclusion that whites are superior to nonwhites.
27
Not all racism operates according to the same dynamics. Joel Kovel
has classified racism into two types: dominative and aversive.28 Domina-
tive racists openly seek to oppress blacks;2" aversive racists innately be-
lieve in white superiority, but feel guilty about holding this belief.30
Both dominative and aversive types have racially discriminatory beliefs
ingrained in the unconscious part of their brain from their childhood.3'
The main difference between dominative and aversive racists is that an
aversive racist's conscious mind will not allow itself to entertain raw
racist messages from the unconscious because guilt, logic, and reason all
reject such messages as "wrong." The unmanifested unconscious racist
feelings do not go away when rejected; rather, they are reformulated,
disguised, and adorned with trappings of logic and reason, in order to
survive the scrutiny of the conscious mind.32 Thus, when an aversive
actor manifests racism, that manifestation already has been cleansed of
evidence of discriminatory intent. The message that emerges from this
27. See id; Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 322-23 (cited in note 14) (stating that "our histori-
cal experience has made racism an integral part of our culture"); Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound. A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
133, 142 (1982) (describing the effects that racial stereotypes have upon minority children). The
lesson with respect to East Asian races may be different, however, given American history after
World War II. America's military fiasco in Vietnam and Japan's success in American markets to
the detriment of American manufacturers would teach that East Asians are superior to whites. See
Helmreich, The Things They Say Behind Your Back at 93-114 (detailing stereotypes that the
Japanese are "hardworking, ambitious, and competitive" and "highly educated and intelligent");
id. at 115-41 (detailing stereotypes that the Chinese are "sly, sinister, and deceitful," "inscruta-
ble," and "learned and wise").
28. Kovel, White Racism at 54-55 (cited in note 14).
29. Id. at 55-60. Others have used the terms "old-fashioned racism" or "red-neck racism" to
describe racism that manifests itself by public expression of racial hatred, doctrines of racial inferi-
ority, and support for segregation. See John B. McConahay and Joseph C. Hough, Jr., Symbolic
Racism, 32 J. Soc. Issues 23, 24 (No. 2, 1976). Kovel's term seems preferable as it is more descrip-
tive than "old-fashioned racism" and less prejudicial than "red-neck racism," which reflects the
Northern myth that the American South is the only situs for overt racism in the United States.
30. Kovel, White Racism at 54-55, 60-61. See also Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 335 (cited in
note 14). Kovel suggests that some whites who classify themselves as liberals fall into the aversive
racist category. He says liberals' inner negative feelings about blacks create a guilt that they try to
assuage by trying to ameliorate discrimination against blacks. Kovel, White Racism at 55. For a
discussion of dominative and aversive racism in depth, see id. at 54-61.
31. See text accompanying notes 14-21.
32. Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 331 (applying psychoanalytic principles gleaned from Anna
Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (International Universities, 1946)). See Freud,
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence at 7-8 (noting that when instinctual impulses from the
unconscious id pass through to the conscious ego, they must "conform to ethical and moral laws by
which the super-ego seeks to control the behavior of the ego,"-and that after the clash between ego
and id, "no longer do we see an undistorted id-impulse but an id-impulse modified by some defen-
sive measure on the part of the ego"). See generally Sigmund Freud, The Ego and The Id (Ho-
garth, 1927).
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process appears to be the product of an unbiased, objective mind but
actually reflects the person's unconscious racial biases.
In contrast, a dominative racist's conscious mind does not reject
the initial raw racist messages. Acts motivated by dominative racism,
therefore, are not hard to detect because the actor has no guilt-based
incentive to mask evidence of discriminatory intent.
B. The Dynamics of Institutional Racism
Institutional racism may be analyzed under one of two theories:
symbolic racism or social dominance. Symbolic racism theory says that
whites' antiblack sentiments are not the result of short-term, material
self-interest, but derive instead from "a blend of antiblack affect" and
"traditional moral values embodied in the Protestant ethic. '3 3 Symbolic
racism theorists illustrate institutional racism by arguing that even
whites who do not have children that are affected personally by a bus-
ing program will oppose such programs generally because they threaten
to undermine traditional moral values.3 4
33. David 0. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, Whites' Opposition to Busing: On Conceptualiz-
ing and Operationalizing Group Conflict, 48 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 1141, 1141 (1985); Mc-
Conahay and Hugh, 32 J. Soc. Issues 23 (cited in note 29). But see Lawrence Bobo, Whites'
Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?, 45 J. Personality & Soc.
Psych. 1196, 1197 (1983) (arguing that the black political movement by its very nature acts as a
threat to whites who fear losing their own interests and privileges, and characterizing white racism
as a shared group interest rather than a moral-based ideology).
Despite their differences, Sears and Kinder agree with Bobo that experimental results indicate
that racist attitudes are the primary determinant of whites' opposition to policies that favor
blacks. These scholars disagree primarily as to how broadly to define "self-interest."
34. Sears and Kinder, 48 J. Personality and Soc. Psych. at 1143. Whites may perceive a bus-
ing program as a threat to moral values because "it conjures up images ... of innocent white
children being sent far from their safe white neighborhoods into schools jammed with academically
unmotivated, disorderly, dangerous blacks." David 0. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, Prejudice and
Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. Personality & Soc. Psych.
414, 421 (1981).
For an example of how symbolic racist reasoning may incorporate "traditional" moral values,
see Jerry Roberts, Quayle Blames Riots on Decline of Family Values, San Francisco Chronicle Al
(May 20, 1992) (quoting former Vice President Dan Quayle as saying that "I believe the lawless
social anarchy which we saw [in the Rodney King riots] is directly related to the breakdown of the
family structure," and that it was time "to renew our public commitment to our Judeo-Christian
values"). It is not this Note's intent to label the former Vice President a "racist," but to use his
statement as an example of this kind of moral-based reasoning.
Symbolic racism and traditional moral values are not necessarily unique to political conserva-
tives. See John J. Ray and F. H. Lovejoy, The Generality of Racial Prejudice, 126 J. Soc. Psych.
563, 563-64 (1986) (stating that experiments show that political conservatism has proven to be a
poor predictor of racial or ethnic prejudice in Australia); Kovel, White Racism at 55 (discussing
dynamics of aversive racism in political liberals). Nevertheless, symbolic racism is very common
among people who firmly believe that economic welfare results from one's personal control over
finances, and not from external factors. Patrick C.L. Heaven and Adrian Furnham, Race Prejudice
and Economic Beliefs, 127 J. Soc. Psych. 483, 485, 487-88 (1987).
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Alternatively, some scholars explain institutional racism by refer-
ence to social dominance theory. This theory characterizes all complex
human social orderings as caste systems, complete with status levels
and varying degrees of possible movement from one caste level to an-
other.3 5 The caste system's stability is maintained by three factors: (1)
the aggregate of instances of institutional racism in society; 6 (2) the
aggregate of instances of individual racism from members of a "hege-
monic group" to members of a "negative reference" group in society;
3 7
and (3) the amount of manifested behavioral differences caused by ra-
cism at different caste levels.38 The amount of race- and racism-related
activity that a particular individual will contribute to society is deter-
mined by intrapersonal factors, such as social comparison and social
identity,3 9  "legitimization myths," 40  and self-esteem
35. Jim Sidanius, Erik Devereux, and Felicia Pratto, A Comparison of Symbolic Racism and
Social Dominance Theory as Explanations for Racial Policy Attitudes, 132 J. Soc. Psych. 377, 380
(1992).
36. Institutional discrimination involves hegemonic institutions such as the legal system, gov-
ernment, and schools allocating social value among different caste levels. Id. Hegomonic groups are
those in power-in America, white males are considered hegemonic. Negative reference groups are
those that are disempowered because of the stigma attached to their prevalent characteristic, be
that race, gender, creed, national origin or sexual identity.
37. Id.
38. Sidanius, et al., call this "behavioral asymmetry." Id. They state that "the behavioral
repertoires of individuals belonging to groups at different levels of the social hierarchy will show
significant differences that have been produced by the dynamics of, and in turn reinforce and
perpetuate, the group-based hierarchy system." Id.
39. Social comparison and social identity describe the process of comparing one's own group
(the "in-group") with other groups (the "out-groups") to form a positive social identity for the in-
group. Id.; Henri Tajfel, The Social Psychology of Minorities (Minority Rights Group, Report No.
38, 1974). This process may work in reverse for some members of negative reference groups. These
persons are already members of the out-group, and when they compare themselves to the in-group,
they may conclude that their group is inferior. See notes 160 and 163.
40. "Legitimation myths" are a coherent set of socially accepted attitudes that give moral
and intellectual legitimacy to unequal distributions of social value. Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto,
132 J. Soc. Psych. at 380-81 (cited in note 35). In that sense, they are similar to symbolic fantasies.
See notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Sample legitimation myths include "meritocracy is egali-
tarian," and "blacks' brains are smaller than whites'." See Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto, 132 J.
Soc. Psych. at 380-81.
The prevalence of these myths may be explained by the belief incongruence theory. See Bar-
nard and Benn, 128 J. Soc. Psych. at 126 (cited in note 20). This theory states that people develop
perceived dissimilarities between their race and other races to reinforce the negative beliefs they
learned at childhood about other races. They perceive that the other races have inherently differ-
ent belief systems. This conclusion reinforces negative racist feelings by combining logic and "ob-
jective" factual data to support one's feelings of superiority. See id.
For discussion and debunking of scientific data that purports to support legitimation myths,
see Halford H. Fairchild, Scientific Racism: The Cloak of Objectivity, 47 J. Soc. Issues 101 (No. 3,
1991). Fairchild points out that even today, some scientists allege physical and intellectual differ-
ences between blacks and whites in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Id. at 108.
For example, Fairchild notes recent works published by J. Phillippe Rushton that theorize that
evolution has made Asians superior to whites and whites superior to blacks. See, for example, J.
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maintenance.41 Unlike the symbolic racism theory, the social dominance
theory is driven by the hegemonic group's desire to stay on top, as op-
posed to any commitment to a moral-based ideology.
C. The Historical Progression From Dominative
to Aversive Racism
Over the course of time, a combination of political and economic
factors gradually have shifted the prevalent type of racism inthis coun-
try from dominative to aversive.42 When agriculture was the dominant
source of economic gain, whites imported blacks to America from Africa
to maximize the utility of white-owned lands. Without some form of
slavery, labor costs would have been astronomical since mechanization
had not yet reduced the need for manual labor and less whites would
Phillippe Rushton, Race Differences in Behaviour: A Review and Evolutionary Analysis, 9 Per-
sonality & Individual Differences 1009 (1988). Rushton bases his conclusion that blacks are inferior
on a number of flawed assumptions. For example, he says whites exhibit more sexual restraint than
blacks, a generalization he confirms by pointing to a study that (he says) shows the races differ in
genitalia size. Id. at 1015. Fairchild, 47 J. Soc. Issues at 108. That study, Fairchild notes, says the
complete opposite: that "[c]ontrary to some widely accepted myths, the size of the penis is not
related to a man's build, skin color, or sexual prowess." Id., quoting E.J. Haeberle, The Sex Atlas:
A New Illustrated Guide 28 (Seabury, 1978). Fairchild found that Rushton's conclusions that
whites were more intelligent than blacks-based upon the "fact" that whites have larger
brains-similarly were unfounded. See Fairchild, 47 J. Soc. Issues at 107 (noting, for example, that
Rushton cited studies for support of his proposition that actually concluded that brain size was
unrelated to race). See generally Hans J. Eysenck, The LQ. Argument: Race, Intelligence and
Education (Library, 1971) (theorizing that black Americans are descended from a less intelligent
segment of the black race because their ancestors failed to evade the slavetraders). Professor Hel-
mreich points out that Eysenck's assumptions could not be proven. See Helmreich, The Things
They Say Behind Your Back at 76 (cited in note 14) (saying there is no way to ascertain whether
Africans had an opportunity to evade capture at all).
41. Self-esteem maintenance, also known as egomaintenance, occurs when an actor's discrim-
ination itself enhances the actor's own ego. Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto, 132 J. Soc. Psych. at
380 (cited in note 35).
42. See James M. Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing Reality, in Benjamin P.
Bowser and Raymond G. Hunt, eds., Impacts of Racism on White Americans 28-30 (Sage, 1981)
(noting research that indicates that the norm for acceptable expressed racial attitudes has shifted
from negative to positive, but that studies also show that negative racial attitudes still persist);
Kovel, White Racism at 32, 192-97 (cited in note 14); Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524 (noting that the Brown
decision coincided with the rising international threat of communism and arguing that America's
abandonment of segregation provided credibility to the world that democracy was a better form of
government). Professor Lawrence argues: "Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as im-
moral and unproductive, this hidden prejudice has become the more prevalent form of racism."
Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 335 (cited in note 14).
Of course, the societal transformation from dominative to aversive racism did not occur over-
night. The change in racist attitudes lagged behind the change in economic method of production,
especially in people who did not necessarily benefit from the new order. See Kovel, White Racism
at 212 (cited in note 14) (speculating that most Americans retain a mixture of dominative and
aversive racist beliefs).
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have been able to afford to own land.43 Further, in the minds of slave-
owning Southerners, the institution of slavery preserved social stability
by ensuring privilege for whites and eliminating poverty.4 In effect,
blacks bore the burden of keeping white socioeconomic status intact.
The institution of slavery-marked by abuse, fatigue, starvation,
and cruelty-embodied pure dominative racism since it expressly
treated blacks as only partially human. The American legal regime con-
sidered slaves to be property: they could be bought, sold, beaten, raped,
killed, and generally used with impunity.45 Even the Constitution only
considered slaves to be three-fifths of a person for representation and
tax purposes.48
The Industrial Revolution eventually made slavery obsolete, as fac-
tories and machines gradually replaced plantations and farm labor as
more efficient means of generating profits.47 With technology increasing
the potential for maximizing production, industry magnates did not
have time for the direct "hands-on" domination of blacks that slavery
required. In a factory setting, indirect control over large quantities of
blacks was much more efficient.48 In broad terms, the transition could
be described as whites giving up complete domination of blacks in ex-
43. See Edmund Sears Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colo-
nial Virginia 295-99 (Norton, 1975) (saying that Virginia planters used slavery to drive down pro-
duction costs, thus creating an economy with more independent landowning producers than an
efficient market would ordinarily support).
44. Antebellum Southern newspapers espoused slavery as the key to white independence. For
example, The Richmond Enquirer wrote that, "[in] this country alone does perfect equality of civil
and social privilege exist among the white population and it exists solely because we have black
slaves," and that "[f]reedom is not possible without slavery." Guyora Binder, Mastery, Slavery,
and Emancipation, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1435, 1448 (1989) (quoting The Richmond Enquirer).
45. See John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community 163 (Oxford, 1972). Professor Blassin-
game describes some of the aspects of slavery in graphic detail:
Characteristically, stocks closed on hapless women and children, mothers cried for the infants
torn cruelly from their arms, and whimpering black women fought vainly to preserve their
virtue in the face of the lash or pleaded for mercy while blood flowed from their bare
buttocks.
Id., quoted in Kendall Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slav-
ery, and Emancipation," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1481, 1485 (1989).
46. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This clause eventually was amended by the Fourteenth
and Sixteenth Amendments.
47. In areas like the North where industrialization took hold quickly, slavery and dominative
racism were abandoned because of inefficiency. In contrast, the South, which took longer to indus-
trialize, retained the vestiges of dominative racism for a comparably longer period of time. See
Bell, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 524-25 (stating that "there were whites who realized that the South could
make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all its potential and profit
only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by state-sponsored segregation").
48. See Kovel, White Racism at 197 (cited in note 14) (saying that "[flor the industrial
North, the primary object of degradation was labor itself").
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change for material gain.49 This exchange of domination for profit
somewhat blurred racial boundaries in the economic caste system: some
blacks were permitted to rise up the system, and many whites were rel-
egated to the same economic status as blacks, although whites were
given preferential treatment whenever possible.
5 0
This transition did not mean that racism abated in the industrial
North. Industrial society used segregation instead of slavery to keep
blacks at an inferior socioeconomic level.51 Once the centers of eco-
nomic production were factories and not plantations, whites no longer
needed blacks to live near their residences. Blacks only had to live near
the factories. Thus, whites designed the Black Codes, and later Jim
Crow laws, to implement their desire to keep distance from blacks.52
As the black labor force grew and the multinational corporation re-
placed the business entrepreneur as the central force in American eco-
nomic society, white hegemony realized that overt segregation
jeopardized the economic and political stability of society.53 The crea-
tion of a freed black work force had in turn created a black consumer
49. See id. at 192. For example, black labor allowed businessmen to keep the salaries of un-
ionized white workers down, since they could be brought in any time the unions held a strike. Earl
Conrad, Jim Crow America 32 (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947).
50. Kovel, White Racism at 197. Black laborers in the workforce typically were the last to be
hired and first to be fired. Further, blacks usually earned lower wages than whites, performed the
most onerous tasks, served as tools of management to break strikes and have been general scape-
goats for all the problems that frustrated white laborers. Id. See also August Meier and Elliott
Rudwick, Attitudes of Negro Leaders Toward the American Labor Movement From the Civil War
to World War I in Julie Jacobson, ed., The Negro and the American Labor Movement 45-48
(Anchor Books, 1968) (noting that labor unions in the late 1800s had exclusionary policies which
prevented blacks from working in many skilled labor positions); Herbert G. Gutman, The Negro
and the United Mine Workers of America in Julie Jacobson, ed., The Negro and the American
Labor Movement 59 (Anchor Books, 1968) (noting that blacks were imported into southeast Ohio
in 1874 and 1875 to break a strike by white miners, and that this caused great tension between
black and white miners).
51. Kovel, White Racism at 207. For a more complete discussion of how industrialization
encouraged the shift from dominative to aversive racism, see id. at 187-199. See also C. Vann
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 19-24 (Oxford, 1955) (noting the experience of a
black newspaperman from Boston who travelled around the South by train in 1885 and found that
Boston was much more segregated than any of the Southern states he visited).
52. The Jim Crow laws segregated residential areas, school districts, restaurants, public bath-
rooms, transportation, and the like. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow at 81-87. See
Roy L. Brooks, Rethinking the American Race Problem 71 (California, 1990). Many of these overt
segregative laws have disappeared; however, Brooks notes that current racial housing patterns have
not changed significantly since the era of Jim Crow laws, even though most blacks would prefer to
live in integrated communities. Id.
53. See Kovel, White Racism at 216 (saying that "the Industrial State ... seeks to perfect
itself and to remove the threats posed by racial turmoil" and that "[t]he State... wishes for itself
nothing so much as that the people within it be perfectly interchangeable nonentities who can do
its differentiated work, buy its differentiated products, and create as little fuss as possible in the
process"); Bell, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 525 (cited in note 42) (saying that some Southern whites real-
ized that segregation was a barrier to economic profit).
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pool. To attract black consumers to the market, the market had to ap-
pear free of racism. 4 Once again inspired by a desire for economic gain,
whites legally prohibited overt segregatory actions.5 The reason for
these prohibitions were that racist intent had become inefficient, much
like slavery. Actions by government and market-suppliers must be race-
neutral on their face, lest they cause political strife and discourage
black participation in the market, both of which run counter to the
goals of society."
The appearance of nonracism is not the same as true nonracism.
The rules limiting blacks' mobility from one caste level to another did
not disappear; they merely became much less detectable. Unwritten,
segregative real estate practices 57 and state constitutional amendments
that mandated referendum votes on whether a low-income housing pro-
ject can be sited in a community 8 are examples of the forms of institu-
tional racism that replaced the Jim Crow laws. These new constructs
mask aversive intent behind race-neutral reasoning. This reasoning sug-
gests that no discrimination takes place at all, and that any detrimental
effect on blacks is accidental.5 9 These structures are protected by a legal
regime that refuses to remedy racism absent some evidence of discrimi-
natory intent.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed to Congress in 1866 and added to the Constitution in 1868.
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to help blacks make the
54. Kovel calls this phenomenon "metaracism." See Kovel, White Racism at 211 (cited in
note 14). He describes it as "the illusion of non-racism co-existing with the continuation of ra-
cism's work." Id. at 217. He says that a telltale sign of metaracism in a society is that "the hand of
the modern State reduces people to its own ends" and "finds it expedient-not ethical, but use-
ful-to eliminate race distinctions in the process." Id. at 216. See also Derrick Bell, Racial Real-
ism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363, 375-77 (1992); Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing Reality
at 33-34 (cited in note 42) (saying that "[e]nergy has shifted from excluding all members of the
[minority] class by legislative, judicial, or executive decree, to including select members of the class
in accordance with specific criteria which preserve the essential character of the in-group").
55. See generally Bell, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 523-25 (saying that "[t]he interest of blacks in
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites"); Norval D. Glenn, The Role of White Resistance and Facilitation in the Negro Struggle
for Equality, in Sethard Fisher, ed., Power and the Black Community: A Reader on Racial Subor-
dination in the United States 414 (Random House, 1970) (saying that self-interest, more than
moral values, is the prime force motivating whites to effect antidiscrimination public policy).
56. Kovel, White Racism at 216-18.
57. See discussion in note 180.
58. See, for example, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
59. Today's housing discrimination techniques are more subtle in that they are sophisticated,
unconscious, institutionalized, and accompanied by nonracial factors. See Brooks, Rethinking the
American Race Problem at 73 (cited in note 52).
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transition from slavery to independence and to thwart the Southern
states' Black Codes.
60
In creating a constitutional protection for blacks from postbellum
oppression, the drafters used open-ended language-the Clause itself
contains no internal constraints to limit its application. Despite this
language, a review of the legislative history of the Amendment and the
social welfare acts passed immediately after the Civil War shows that
Congress's predominant intent was to help blacks make the transition
from slavery to independence, not to mandate equal treatment for ev-
eryone. 1 In fact, one legislator who supported the Amendment distin-
guished the plight of impoverished whites from that of imporverished
blacks: "[Whites'] civil rights and immunities are already sufficiently
protected by the possession of political power, the absence of which [for
blacks] necessitates governmental protection. '8 2 There were no state-
ments in the congressional record, from either supporters or opponents,
indicating that any legislators thought the Equal Protection Clause
would cover whites as well as blacks.6 3
60. Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753, 754 (1985). The Black Codes, enacted after the abolition of slav-
ery, effectively prohibited blacks from virtually all occupations except servitude, denied them judi-
cial relief against whites, and prevented them from owning real property. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1873); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 445-47 (Little, Brown,
1986). These Codes were designed to circumvent the Thirteenth Amendment's anti-slavery provi-
sions and other Reconstruction measures. See Stone, et al., Constitutional Law at 445.
61. See Schnapper, 71 Va. L. Rev. at 756-88 (reprinting various legislators' statements re-
garding the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction social welfare programs). Congressmen
opposing the Fourteenth Amendment and welfare programs such as the Freedmen's Bureau Acts
argued that these enactments tipped the equality balance too far in favor of blacks. Proponents
agreed that the equality mandated by the statute was one-sided, but argued that whites had to
rectify the evils they had visited upon blacks for so many years. See id. From this, it seems that
both sides agreed on the meaning of equality and the proponents triumphed without compromise,
leading Schnapper to conclude that "equality" was only intended with respect to blacks. Id. at 785,
789. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) (saying that "[t]here can be no doubt
that a major purpose of this amendment was to safeguard Negroes against discriminatory state
laws-state laws that fail to give Negroes protection equal to that afforded white people"). But see
William D. Guthrie, Lectures on the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States 24-25 (Da Capo, 1898) (reprinting the 1882 statement of Roscoe Conkling, one of
the Amendment's drafters, that at the time the Amendment was ratified, "individuals and joint
stock companies were appealing for congressional and administrative protection against invidious
and discriminating state and local taxes," and arguing that this evidences that the Amendment
was not intended to only benefit blacks). Conkling's statements are fairly weak evidence of the
drafters' intent, however, since they were made 14 years after the Amendment was passed and do
not allege that the drafters were influenced by these interest groups.
62. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 75 (1866) (statement of Rep. Phelps), reprinted
in Schnapper, 71 Va. L. Rev. at 768.
63. Given the language of the Clause, and the fact that the drafters doubtlessly had racist
beliefs themselves, some have inferred that the drafters did not intend the Clause to confer any
substantive rights upon blacks either. See, for example, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary
10, 55-60, 91 (Harvard, 1977) (arguing that the drafters' racism prevents a construction of the
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While the legislative, history suggests that the drafters may have
predicted the affirmative action debate, they did not fare so well in
fashioning a standard for determining which cases warranted equal pro-
tection review. This task was left to the courts.
A. Two Models of Equal Protection Analysis
The courts have employed two major models for applying the
Equal Protection Clause: the intent standard, and the effects test. The
intent standard examines whether the legislators, in passing the dis-
criminatory measures, primarily intended to disadvantage a minority
group.64 The effects test focuses on whether the law in question actually
had a disparate impact on a minority group.
The theory underlying the intent standard is that volition is a nec-
essary element of racial discrimination. 5 The Supreme Court has stated
that the intent standard protects legitimate state legislation that only
incidentally has adverse effects upon minorities. The standard avoids
opening the courthouse doors to equal protection challenges based
solely on evidence that a state act has detrimentally affected a minor-
ity.6 6 One scholar has noted that this standard also reflects a concern
that the Fourteenth Amendment should be constrained so as not to reg-
ulate truly private matters.
6 7
Because the intent standard requires plaintiffs to prove discrimina-
tory intent, equal protection claims are difficult to win. 8 For a plaintiff
Fourteenth Amendment that would confer blacks with the right to vote). But see John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 200-01 n.70 (Harvard, 1980) (stating that Berger's argument lacks "any
attempt whatsoever to account for the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment, explicitly granting
blacks the vote, was proposed and ratified only two years later"). Professor Ely notes that the two
amendments were supported by the same legislators. Id.
64. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 (1976) (noting that legislative purpose to
discriminate must be present to satisfy the intent requirement).
65. See, for example, James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Per-
spectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 633,
643 (1983). Professor Blumstein argues that because racial discrimination is the act of treating
similarly situated individuals differently on account of their race, volition must be an essential
element of racial discrimination. Id. at 643-44 (stating that "a finding of unconstitutional discrimi-
nation therefore rests on a finding of intent").
66. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(saying that "it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing
numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their deci-
sions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality").
67. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 100 (1967).
68. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
Yale L. J. 1205, 1274-75, 1279, 1283 (1970). When the defendant is an institution of municipal or
local government, the burden of proving intent can be almost impossible to meet. See, for example,
Brooks, Rethinking the American Race Problem at 84-85 (cited in note 52) (discussing the incredi-
ble evidentiary burden that the intent test places on plaintiffs bringing land-use cases).
[Vol. 46:937
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION
to challenge a law successfully under the intent standard, she must
prove that the lawmakers intended the legislation to disadvantage her
group,69 and that the legislation harmed her specifically. This first bur-
den is particularly difficult to meet: legislators rarely will include racist
reasoning in the public record, and the plaintiff is unlikely to have ac-
cess to other evidentiary sources.
The theory behind the effects test, by contrast, is that the Four-
teenth Amendment safeguards against laws that unnecessarily disad-
vantage blacks. The effects test only requires the plaintiff to show that
the law had a disparate impact upon members of her minority group; it
ignores the intent of the legislators. This approach defines racism to
include all acts that have a substantially deleterious effect on blacks,
regardless of whether the actor intended such an effect.7 1
If a plaintiff meets the burden of proof required by the governing
equal protection model, a court will then apply "strict scrutiny" to the
legislation. Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that it has
a compelling interest in keeping the legislation and that the legislation's
ends are narrowly tailored to fit its means; otherwise, the court will
strike it down. 2 In practice, the application of strict scrutiny virtually
assures the doom of the legislative act;13 the few government interests
that have proved compelling in the past are national security in time of
war,74  and the federal government's acts to remedy past
discrimination. 5
69. Such evidence could be found in the specific sequence of events preceding the challenged
decision, the historical background of the decision, legislative history, or even in the impact of the
decision if a clear pattern of discrimination appears that cannot otherwise be explained. Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68. The decisionmakers themselves usually will not be available for plain-
tiffs to call as witnesses, however, because of legislative privilege. Id. at 268; Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
70. See note 69. See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Austin II), 532 F.2d 380 (5th
Cir. 1976), in which the court of appeals noted:
[I]t is difficult-and often futile-to obtain direct evidence of [an] official's intentions. Rather
than announce his intention of violating antidiscrimination laws, it is far more likely that the
state official "will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods
subtle and illusive-for we deal with an area in which 'subtleties of conduct.., play no small
part.'"
Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
71. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). See also Toxic Wastes and Race in
the United States ix-x (United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1987).
72. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
73. Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1059 (5th Cir. 1984) (saying a
suspect classification "will almost never be based on legitimate governmental reasons" and thus
would not survive strict scrutiny).
74. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
75. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). Because the fed-
eral government mandated the FCC set up a licensing program that favored minorities, a so-called
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If the plaintiff is unable to meet the requisite burden, the legisla-
iion only receives "rational basis" scrutiny, which means that the law
survives unless the court cannot conceive of a reason behind it.76 Ac-
cordingly, whether plaintiffs will succeed with their equal protection
claim turns on whether they can meet the evidentiary burden. 7 Unfor-
tunately, the burden to prove discriminatory intent in cases involving
aversive racism is nearly insurmountable because of the nature of aver-
sive racism. Thus, an intent standard assures that only the most obvi-
ous cases of racial discrimination receive a judicial remedy.
The Equal Protection Clause itself does not suggest which ap-
proach the courts should adopt.78 In all probability, this is because the
Clause was drafted at a time when social and legal disincentives to ex-
pressing racist motivations were emerging for the first time.79 The only
clue available is that the drafters intended to help blacks by remedying
the effects of racial discrimination. 0 The proper approach to equal pro-
tection law, accordingly, should be the one that incorporates current
understandings about racial discrimination.
"benign race-conscious measure," the Court accorded deference to the program. 110 S. Ct. at 3007-
08.
76. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). See James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971) (holding that a public housing referendum was not designed to disadvan-
tage a suspect class, and that the legislature was advancing democratic decisionmaking by making
public housing a referendum issue). But see Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (holding that no
rational basis existed for a zoning law prohibiting construction of a facility for the mentally handi-
capped). Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341, 346 (1980) (Marshall dissenting) (saying
that legislation designed for the purpose of discouraging individuals from exercising a fundamental
right-in this case, the right not to procreate-would not meet even the rational basis test).
Professor Ely argues that rational basis is an inappropriate test to apply to true cases of racial
discrimination because statistics can be used co rationalize discriminatory acts. Ely, Democracy
and Distrust at 31 (cited in note 63). For example, he says that apartheid is a rational means of
avoiding racial strife, and that job discrimination is rational given the statistics that whites gener-
ally are better educated than blacks. Id. Professor Ely favors a stricter standard of review in all
cases involving racial discrimination by the state. Id.
For a discussion of what the Court has found to be illegitimate government purposes under
the rational basis test, see D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and the State's En-
forcement of Morality, - U. Ill. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1993).
77. See Brooks, Rethinking the American Race Problem at 52 (cited in note 52) (calling the
Supreme Court's equal protection analysis "outcome-determinative").
78. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 32 (saying the key to which inequalities are tolerable
under the Clause is not to be found in its text or the words of its writers).
79. See Schnapper, 71 Va. L. Rev. at 754-83 (cited in note 60) (describing the Reconstruction
legislation enacted to assist blacks).
80. See id. at 784-88. See also Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 98 (saying that the Clause's




B. Judicial Interpretation of the Clause
In the early years of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court said that the Clause provided for across-the-board equal treat-
ment of whites and blacks under the law,81 which included eradicating
the institutional enslavement of blacks in substance as well as in form.82
The notion of "equal treatment," however, has changed over the years.
For example, in the earlier equal protection cases, the Court held that
equal treatment under the law did not require racial integration,
8 3
thereby sanctioning a "separate but equal" approach. In 1938, the
Court held that integration was required if the state did not provide
blacks with a facility that it provided for whites.84 In 1950, the Court
held that a black admitted to a white facility had to be treated exactly
the same as the whites.8 5 This progression of cases culminated in Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka ("Brown I").86
In Brown I, the Court held that the "separate but equal" approach
was per se invalid in public education because segregation in public
schools was inherently unequal and violated the Equal Protection
Clause.8 7 The Court cited no direct legal authority for its holding, only
contemporary psychological studies that showed segregated schools
stigmatized black students.88 The opinion also rejected attempts to
"turn the clock back" to reconstruct the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, saying that public education had to be examined in light
of current psychological knowledge to determine whether plaintiffs were
deprived of equal protection of the laws. 9
After Brown I, the Court borrowed from both the effects and intent
models to construct variations of a cost-benefit balancing test: if de-
fendant's action looked like it was racially motivated, the Court focused
81. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court stated: "The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law ... ." 163 U.S. 537,
554 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
82. For purposes of this Note, the discussion of equal protection law is limited to situations
where a suspect class can be defined according to race or ethnicity, and a given state action has the
effect of treating whites more favorably than the suspect class.
83. See, for example, Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
84. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938).
85. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950).
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. Id. at 495.
88. Id. at 494 & n.11. Some of the justices may have felt comfortable relying on psychologi-
cal, rather than legal, bases for their decision because of their strong feelings that segregation was
illegitimate. See Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato and Rosemary Metrailer, Desegregation
from Brown to Alexander 89 (Southern Ill. Univ., 1977). For example, in conference after reargu-
ment, Chief Justice Earl Warren told the other justices that they had to prohibit segregation,
regardless of precedents, because segregation was wholly based on the pretense of "the inherent
inferiority of the colored race." Id. (quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren).
89. 347 U.S. at 494.
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on effects and did not inquire into actual intent;90 if the Court could
not clearly discern racial motivations, it applied the intent test.9 1 In so-
cial cognitivist terms, the Court required intent when plaintiffs alleged
aversive racism, but not when plaintiffs alleged dominative racism.
In cases challenging Southern discriminatory practices the Court
did not require plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent, probably be-
cause the Court already was convinced that Southern states were acting
from racist motivations. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education,2 the Court approved the limited use
of mathematical ratios by the district court to determine whether a
North Carolina school district's desegregation plan was inadequate.93
The Swann Court did not require discriminatory intent; it merely as-
sumed that racism was at work. The Court did not inquire into whether
the challenged desegregation plan was intentionally designed to main-
tain separation of black and white students, nor did it examine whether
other factors supported the school board's plan. Instead, the Swann
Court noted that North Carolina had a long history of deliberate dis-
crimination against blacks, enforced through a segregative school sys-
tem. 4 Accordingly, the Court stated that the lower court correctly
evaluated the desegregation plan by examining its effectiveness.95 Ra-
cist intent was presumed.
Similarly, in Palmer v. Thompson,96 the Court applied an effects
test to a Mississippi city's decision to close its public swimming pools
rather than integrate them as required by a court decree. Unlike
Swann, however, the Court found no discriminatory effect because the
pool closings affected whites as well as blacks, thus disadvantaging both
races equally. 7 While the dissent viewed the pool closings as an expres-
90. See Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 481 (cited in note 60) (saying that "[t]o avoid end-
less litigation with school boards operating in bad faith, the Court moved toward result-oriented,
bright-line remedies").
91. See, for example, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
92. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id. at 5-6 (asserting that "[t]his case and those argued with it arose in States having a
long history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to
carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race") (foot-
notes omitted).
95. Id. at 25 (saying that "a school authority's remedial plan or a district court's remedial
decree is to be judged by its effectiveness"). See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967)
(saying the Court should examine "historical context" and "ultimate effect" of zoning laws chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds).
96. 403 U.S. 217 (1971), overruled by Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
97. Id. at 220. The Court also noted that the city showed that integrated pools would lose
money. Id. at 226.
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sion of official racial segregative policy,98 the Palmer majority stated
that evidence of the city's intent to frustrate the court decree was irrel-
evant, in part because intent was easy to mask and difficult to
ascertain. 99
In post-Brown I cases involving more complex allegations of racial
discrimination, especially school desegregation cases, the Court focused
on whether the areas involved had intended to exclude blacks from
their schools. 0' Many of these cases challenged segregatory school dis-
tricting in the North and West, where the history of discrimination was
less apparent.101 Other cases involved suburban school districts that re-
fused to participate in the desegregation of urban-schools.1 0 2 In these
cases, the Court stated that a school district should not have to partici-
pate in another district's desegregation plan unless it had substantially
caused the alleged discrimination in that other district or the district
borders had been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.1 03 Even
though the desegregation plan would be ineffective without including
nearby suburbs,1 0 4 the Court did not want to impose interdistrict relief
98. Id. at 240-41 (White dissenting). The dissent saw the pool closings as "nothing more or
less than a most effective expression of official policy that Negroes and whites must not be permit-
ted to mingle together when using the services provided by the city." Id. at 241. As one scholar
notes, the closing of swimming pools in the face of desegregation was particularly poignant since
those pools were the public facilities where bodily contact between the races was most likely to
occur. George Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59
Cal. L. Rev. 1384, 1402 (1971).
99. 403 U.S. at 224-25 (saying that "it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment" and that
if a court struck a law purely for the bad motives of its supporters "it would presumably be valid
as soon as the ... relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons").
100. See, for example, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
101. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton 1).
The importance of the history of discrimination can be attributed to political factors. Follow-
ing Brown I and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court had a great deal of political support
for allowing district judges wide latitude to fashion desegregation requirements for Southern
school districts. When it came time to apply Brown to other parts of the country, however, "the
collapse of political support was inevitable." Stone, et al., Constitutional Law at 481 (cited in note
60). This may explain why the Court developed the intent inquiry for equal protection cases not
arising in the South. Compare the Southern Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. at 224 (saying that "it
is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations,
that lie behind a legislative enactment") with the Midwestern Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 413 (stating
that "the finding that the pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not homogeneous,
standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing
that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the Board").
102. See, for example, Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744 (saying that "[o]ur prior [school desegrega-
tion] holdings have been confined to violations and remedies within a single school district").
103. Id. at 744-45.
104. Id. at 784 (Marshall dissenting).
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where the affected districts did not violate the Constitution. °5 In effect,
the Court was looking for dominative racism. Accordingly, these suits
troubled the Court because the defendant communities did not display
the traits of dominative racism commonly associated with racial
discrimination.
Further evidence that the intent requirement evolved to ensure
that the Equal Protection Clause only prohibited dominative racism
can be found in the eventual shift of the burden of proof from defend-
ants to plaintiffs. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo.,03
one of the first cases to challenge a city school board's system-wide seg-
regation, the Court placed the ultimate burden of proof on defendants.
Only one area of schools in the district was segregated by law; therefore,
the plaintiffs had to show an intent to segregate the whole system.
10 7
Nevertheless, the Court held that plaintiffs had shifted the burden of
proof on the intent issue to defendants by bringing evidence of segrega-
tion in a few schools in the system.108 The defendant then had to prove
that segregative intent was not a factor behind its actions. 10 9 The Keyes
Court emphasized that the defendant could not meet this burden
merely by offering a racially neutral basis for its action; the defendant
either had to prove an absence of discriminatory intent or that there
was no causation connecting the school district's actions and the
segregation.110
While the lack of historical discrimination in Denver warranted a
requirement that some showing of intent be made, other factors were
present that convinced the Court that racism was at work. A district
court already had found that the Denver school board had deliberately
segregated schools in the Park Hill section of the city."' Nonetheless,
the district court did not extend its finding or its desegregation order to
105. Id. at 744-45. Note that the Court was not compelled to reach this conclusion because
Michigan's school districts were state agencies. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644 (1902) (stating
that Michigan school districts were state agencies). Accordingly, the Detroit school district's act of
imposing segregation imputed to the entire state, making a more statewide remedy like interdis-
trict desegregation appropriate. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 771-72 (White dissenting). See also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (saying that political subdivisions of states were never
regarded to be sovereign entities, but were rather designed to assist the state in carrying out state
functions).
106. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
107. Id. at 207.
108. Id. The Court applied the evidentiary principle that "the prior doing of other similar
acts, whether clearly a part of a scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possibility that the act in
question was done with innocent intent." Id. (quoting John Henry Wigmore, 2 Evidence 200 (Lit-
tle, Brown, 3d ed. 1940)).
109. 413 U.S. at 208, 210.
110. Id. at 210.
111. 313 F. Supp. 61, 66-68 (D. Colo. 1970).
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other areas within the school board's control largely because the segre-
gative actions taken in those areas preceded the Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation decision. 112 The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning,
indicating that the "remoteness of time" of the segregative act was ir-
relevant." 3 Accordingly, even though Keyes involved a Western city,
the Court felt comfortable applying a modified effects test.
In later cases in which no circumstances indicated dominative ra-
cist characteristics, the Court placed the ultimate burden of proof of
intent on the plaintiffs. In Washington v. Davis,"4 two black police of-
ficers challenged the District of Columbia's use of a written civil service
examination intended to determine whether individuals should be hired
or promoted by the police department. The officers claimed that the
test was discriminatory because blacks failed four times as often as
whites. They also argued that the Court should apply the disparate im-
pact test announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," 5 a Title VII case.
The district court found in favor of the police department," 6 but the
D.C. Circuit reversed under Griggs, saying that discriminatory intent
was irrelevant given the disparate impact that the examination had on
blacks." The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit."18 It held that
while disparate impact sometimes can establish a prima facie case for
discriminatory intent, such effect is not sufficient to warrant judicial
interference with a facially neutral state law." 9
The next year, the Supreme Court gave more shape to the amor-
phous Washington decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.20 In Arlington Heights, the plaintiff de-
velopers had applied to rezone an area from single- to multi-family
dwelling classification so that it could build housing units for low- and
middle-income tenants.' 2 ' The village denied the rezoning request, and
the plaintiffs challenged this decision under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court upheld the village's denial of rezoning because the
plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent. The Court fleshed out
the intent requirement by listing a number of evidentiary factors that
112. Id. at 69-70.
113. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210.
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
115. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
116. 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
117. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
118. 426 U.S. at 238.
119. Id. at 239. Washington was the first case to state that discriminatory intent was a neces-
sary aspect of an equal protection violation. Samuel Issacharoff, Note, Making the Violation Fit
the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 Yale L. J. 328, 328 (1982).
120. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
121. Id. at 254.
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future plaintiffs could use to show intent: disproportionate impact
against one race; a clear pattern of discriminatory effect; invidious ra-
cism in the historical background of the decision; any evidence in the
legislative history behind the state act; and any departures from the
normal decisionmaking process.
122
After Washington and Arlington Heights, the Court continued to
espouse the intent standard, but demonstrated more concern with
whether it found evidence of dominative racism than pure intent. In
cases in which racism seemed obvious yet evidence of intent was thin,
the Court showed a willingness to soften substantially the test's re-
quirements. For example, in Castaneda v. Partida,123 a Mexican-Ameri-
can challenged a county grand jury selection process under the Equal
Protection Clause for gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Ameri-
cans.12 4 The Castaneda Court said that Washington and Arlington
Heights had recognized that facially neutral legislation is not valid
under the Equal Protection Clauge if it is the result of a clear pattern of
discrimination, especially if that pattern cannot be justified on grounds
other than race. 25 The Court concluded from this determination that
the plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of discriminatory intent
merely by showing disparate impact in both the present case and in
society at large.126 In other words, the Castaneda Court prescribed an
effects test because it felt comfortable that racial discrimination was at
work.
Some federal appellate courts initially resisted rigid application of
the intent standard as laid out in Washington and Arlington Heights.
In United States v. Texas Education Agency ("Austin II"1),127 the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs adequately demonstrated intent by
showing that the racially discriminatory effect of the school board's acts
were reasonably foreseeable. 2 Given the wide gap between foreseeabil-
ity (knowledge the act would disparately affect blacks) and intent (pur-
122. Id. at 266-67.
123. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
124. Id. at 485-87. The grand jury had indicted the plaintiff for burglary with intent to rape.
Id. at 485.
125. Id. at 493.
126. Id. at 493-94.
127. 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977).
128. Id. at 167-68. See also Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. School Dist. No.
21, 512 F.2d 37, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1975). In Austin II, the Fifth Circuit effectively turned the intent
test on its head. For example, it stated that "the most probative evidence of intent will be objec-
tive evidence of what actually happened rather than describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor," and that "normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his
deeds." 564 F.2d at 168.
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pose that the act would disparately affect blacks), 29 it seems the Fifth
Circuit was actually applying a modified effects test.
Similarly, in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 30 the Sixth
Circuit avoided application of a true intent standard. The court of ap-
peals agreed with the district court that the cumulative total of racially
imbalanced schools in the Dayton system was sufficient to constitute a
system-wide equal protection violation. 3 ' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated both decisions, and remanded to the district court
for additional factfinding in consideration of Washington and Arlington
Heights. 32 The Court found the "cumulative violations" test too vague
and the Sixth Circuit's statements about remedy too broad. 33 Although
the district court, on remand, found that the plaintiffs had failed to
show discriminatory purpose,3 the Sixth Circuit reversed, inferring in-
tent from the fact that the extensive system-wide segregation in the
district was originally set up as an overt policy and never remedied.
135
The second time, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
decision.
13 6
Pinpointing exactly what motivated the Court to choose the intent
standard is difficult. The Washington Court said the disproportionate
impact standard would have a "far reaching" effect on "a whole range"
of legislation. 137 This reasoning is particularly unpersuasive because
precedent dictated a restrained application of the disparate impact
test."'38 The Court also has expressed concern that only those who inten-
tionally violate the Equal Protection Clause should have to participate
in the remedy,'39 treating these violations as if they were criminal.1
40
129. See, for example, Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 224 (Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1989).
[A]ction is not purposive with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it
was his conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result. It is
meaningful to think of the actor's attitude as different if he is simply aware that his conduct
is of the required nature or that the prohibited result is practically certain to follow from his
conduct.
Id.
130. 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 693. The appellate court also decided that the district court's remedy was not
broad enough given the scope of Dayton's violation. Id. at 704.
132. 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977).
133. Id. at 413, 417.
134. 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
135. 583 F.2d 243, 247-48 (6th Cir. 1978).
136. 443 U.S. 526 (1977).
137. 426 U.S. at 248.
138. See Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discrim-
inatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. Ill. L. Forum 961, 990 (noting the appli-
cation of the effects test in Title VIII housing discriminatin cases).
139. See, for example, Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744; Dayton Bd. of Educ., 433 U.S. at 420.
140. In both criminal and equal protection law, the defendant must have a culpable state of
mind before the court will "punish" him for a bad act. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Note,
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Given the current psychological evidence that shows race discrimination
also operates on an unconscious level, this concern for intent also lacks
basis.1
4 1
Some critics argue that the Court's decisions demonstrate a con-
cern that an economic class of whites will have to make sacrifices in
order to accommodate the black liberty in question. 42 These critics also
accuse the Court of refusing to redress racial issues until after they
have snowballed to a point that could threaten the system. 43 Other
commentators argue that the Court is concerned that a slow and costly
equal protection suit could have potentially harmful repercussions upon
a defendant community, such as rising land costs, changes in the com-
munity's demographic make-up, delays in local public improvement
projects, and burdensome litigation costs.144
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 Yale L. J.
111 (1983).
141. See Part II.A., B.
142. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law § 7.11 at 443 (Little, Brown,
2d ed. 1980).
In the absence of overt racial discrimination of a character that shocks the public conscience,
the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, will not authorize judicial relief providing an
effective remedy for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of
middle and upper-class whites. It follows that the availability of Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection in racial cases is not actually determined by the character of harm suffered by blacks
or the quantum of liability proved against whites. Rather, racial remedies are the outward
manifestations of unspoken and perhaps unconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if
granted, will secure or advance societal interests deemed important by the upper classes.
Id.
143. See Kovel, White Racism at 221 (cited in note 14). Kovel describes the American pat-
tern of discriminatory reform as follows:
[A] wrong is spotted (when it becomes threatening); efforts are made to redress it; and these
efforts lead to a reduction of the threat, a rationalization of the basic power-generating struc-
tures, an easing-indeed a further purification-of the white conscience; and either the neg-
lect of the black victim, or the infliction upon him of a new variety of indignity.
Id. at 220-21. See also Bell, Race, Racism and American Law at 231. Professor Bell states that ever
since the law began to attempt to prevent the government from depriving blacks of their basic
rights, courts have only been able to intervene in certain cases. He observes:
At some infinitely variable point-sometimes in matters of little moment, at others when the
need for protection is critical to the maintenance of dignity, poverty, or even life itself-the
legal provisions designed and enacted to protect black rights become suddenly, and without
notice, inoperable.
Id.
144. See Henry McGee, Urban Renewal in the Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 Va. L. Rev.
826, 878 (1970). Some of these negative repercussions were borne out in the ten years of litigation
over the issue of whether low-rent public housing in Chicago should continue to be placed exclu-
sively in black ghettoes. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). After three years of litigation in
the trial court, the district judge ordered the Chicago Housing Authority to site the next 700 pub-
lic housing dwellings in white neighborhoods, and 75% of all public housing in white neighbor-
hoods thereafter. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 738-39 (N.D. Ill.
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C. The Flaws Inherent in the Intent Standard
Whatever the reason behind the Court's adoption of the intent
standard, it is a flawed measure of racial discrimination and should be
discarded. 145 The intent standard is flawed in many levels. First, it
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the causes and manifestations of
racial discrimination. Proponents of the intent test believe that racists
are evil and that race-based decisions are made on a conscious level.146
These beliefs lead them to conclude that aversive racism does not exist,
or alternatively, that if it does exist, it is not within the ambit of the
Equal Protection Clause. They look into the actor's state of mind to
determine whether racial discrimination took place. Similar to the re-
quirements of criminal law, the intent-based approach requires a show-
ing of a culpable mens rea before an equal protection violation will be
found.
147
Social cognitivists have shown, however, that racist tendencies are
a natural by-product of a child's development of a sense of identity.
48
They have also shown that racist tendencies may operate on a precon-
scious level, motivating individuals to act in a racially discriminatory
manner without being aware that they are doing so. 49 Such aversive
racism is no less harmful to blacks than dominative racism, and it
1969). During the next three years, municipal authorities refused to approve new public housing
construction. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law § 8.13.1 at 558 (cited in note 142). The dis-
trict court then removed the power of approval from the Chicago municipal authorities, ordering
site proposals to be sent directly to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for ap-
proval. 342 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973).
While the plaintiffs eventually prevailed in the courtroom, Professor Bell notes that this vic-
tory did not necessarily affect much: by 1979 very few public housing projects had been con-
structed in Chicago. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law § 8.13.2 at 560.
145. In the past, the Supreme Court has abandoned constitutional tests when modern scien-
tific knowledge shows them to be outdated. In the equal protection context, the Court discarded
the "separate but equal" doctrine because of psychological data that segregation stigmatized black
children. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.11. See also notes 86-90 and accompanying text. Simi-
larly, the Court has relied on medical evidence concerning the viability of a fetus to develop its
trimester framework for abortions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and later used more cur-
rent medical evidence to dismantle this framework, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2798 (1992) (noting that medical advances had pushed viability to an earlier point in the preg-
nancy period).
146. See, for example, Blumstein, 69 Va. L. Rev. 643, 644 n.55 (cited in note 65) (saying that
volition is an essential element of racism, and describing racism as "opprobrious" and "contumeli-
ous"). See also Torres, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 839 (cited in note 14) (stating that "racism has been
and should be a term of special opprobrium," and warning that "[w]e risk having the term lose its
condemnatory force by using it too often or inappropriately"). See also Kovel, White Racism at 55
(cited in note 14) (saying that only "dominative racism.., includes what we ordinarily think of as
the racially prejudiced person").
147. See Karlan, Note, 93 Yale L. J. at 122-26 (cited in note 140).
148. See text accompanying notes 14-21.
149. See text accompanying notes 22-25.
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therefore deserves recognition under equal protection analysis. While
aversive racism may be less morally reprehensible than dominative ra-
cism, this alone should not preclude an equal protection remedy be-
cause the goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to improve the
condition of blacks, not to punish racists.
Beyond these fundamental shortcomings, systemic factors prevent
the intent test from detecting racism. The intent test can only work if
governmental decisionmaking bodies follow strict articulation and re-
cording procedures, always clearly stating a specific purpose for the de-
cision. 150 The necessary recordation may be partially satisfied at the
federal level, where legislative debates, congressional committee reports
and agency rulemaking deliberations are made public. 5' On the state
and local levels, however, articulation and recording requirements are
less stringent.152 Where the action is taken by a state or local govern-
ment, or pursuant to authority granted by state or local governments,
there may not even be a full legislative record for plaintiffs to search for
150. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 127 (cited in note 63). Note that no judicially im-
posed incentive for legislatures to include intent in the record exists. If the Court finds no evidence
of legislative intent, it almost always will presume legitimacy if it can imagine a permissible pur-
pose for the action. Id. at 126-27 n.*. Compare Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972)
(arguing that the court should consider only articulated legislative purposes).
151. The record requirements are only partially satisfied on the federal level because many
aspects of federal administrative rulemaking are not recorded, such as pressures from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). See National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 858 F.2d 1019, 1031
& n.22 (5th Cir. 1988), vac'd in part on other grounds, 866 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing
evidence that OMB had coerced the agency to change its regulatory standard behind the scenes as
"colorful," but holding that a challenge to the promulgated rule must "stand or fall on the basis of
the record before the agency, not on the basis of some 'secret record' of OMB's"). Other unre-
corded influences on decisionmaking are political favor-trading discussions and White House inter-
vention. See Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 F.2d 298, 352, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that unless
expressly forbidden by Congress, the President may meet with agency administrators during or
after the public notice-and-comment period, and that such meetings need not be noted or summa-
rized in the public record).
Even if plaintiffs could gain access to the nonpublic record behind an agency rule, the courts
have held such evidence insufficient to support a rule challenge. See National Grain & Feed, 858
F.2d at 1031. Compare Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (saying that plaintiff's evidence that OMB coerced OSHA to delete a toxic substance
short-term exposure limit provision from the final regulation sent to the Federal Register raised
"difficult constitutional questions," but deciding the case in favor of plaintiffs based on a lack of
support for the deletion in the administrative record).
152. State legislatures often do not record their decisionmaking sessions as thoroughly as
does the United States Congress. See Thomas A. Woxland, Researching Legal History, cited in
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and
the Creation of Public Policy 909, 912 (West, 1988). Additionally, any records that are kept often
will be physically inaccessible, and may not be indexed as comprehensively as federal legislative
materials. Id. For a list of sources of legislative history for each state, see Mary L. Fisher, Guide to
State Legislative and Administrative Materials (Littleton, 4th ed. 1988).
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evidence of discriminatory intent.15 8 Even if a legislative record exists,
whether that record would expose a discriminatory purpose is question-
able.1 4 More than likely, any such record would reflect alternative ra-
tionales for the decision that do not directly implicate race. 55 If there
are racist reasons behind a particular action, they probably will not
show up in the record, as the decisionmakers may not be aware of them
or may be prudent enough not to make these reasons. In either case,
the record will likely reflect only neutral purposes.156 Legislative deci-
sions may be made for reasons that do not appear in the record at all.
157
Another misguided belief behind the intent standard is that a legis-
lature cannot discriminate against a minority if members of that minor-
ity are part of the decisionmaking process. 15 8 This belief is not
153. The courts have faced the problem of an empty record most acutely in the context of
equal protection challenges to schemes adopted by referendum, usually involving public housing
projects, that have a disparate impact upon a minority. See, for example, James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Since decisionmaking by referendum
allows the populace to vote on the issue without stating their underlying reasons, there is no record
upon which plaintiffs can bring suit. In such cases, courts have required plaintiffs to present evi-
dence that the referendum provision rested on race-based distinctions. See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at
141; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. This seems to require plaintiffs to prove that the legislature dele-
gated the issue to the constituency because it knew that the referendum would produce the desired
discriminatory effect.
154. For a review of the textualist criticisms of relying on legislative history to interpret
statutes, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1299-1310 (1990).
155. These rationales may be compared to the aversive racist's unconscious concealment of
irrational racist tendencies behind thoughts and desires with more rational appeal. See the discus-
sion at text accompanying notes 30-32. See, for example, Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 585 n.193 (1977) (saying that in
the land-use context "virtually any land-use decision will satisfy minimal scrutiny because it will
be rationally related to a legitimate typically environmental, objective").
156. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 128 n.* (cited in note 63) (stating that "it is a rare
motivation that is so crassly political that it cannot itself be characterized ... as laudable");
Brooks, Rethinking the American Race Problem at 87 (cited in note 52) (saying that would-be
discriminators or segregationists can infer from the intent test "that, in the final analysis, housing
discrimination and segregation are permissible as long as true motives are kept private and every-
thing is done with a smile").
157. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 127 (saying that in group deliberations, "people often
vote for measures for reasons sufficient to themselves even though no one else has put those rea-
sons on the record").
The possibility of a secret record becomes a greater concern when the issue before a legislature
involves a well-organized, politically connected interest group on one side and a relatively unorgan-
ized and unconnected group on the other side. In these cases, a politician will have strong incen-
tives to favor the organized group because it is more likely than the unorganized group to respond
politically. Public choice theorists would call this an ideal "rent-seeking" situation. See Jonathan
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 232 (1986); Zeppos, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1304 (cited in note
154). For an example, see the discussion in Part V.B.
158. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 37 (Harper &
Row, 1970). For example, in August 1991, a district court in Virginia dismissed a black group's
efforts to enjoin the siting of a regional landfill in a predominantly black neighborhood. R.I.S.E.,
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misguided in principle, but in actuality.159 While the lack of political
representation 'may create incentives for legislators to discriminate
against a minority, the presence of minority representatives alone does
not guarantee discrimination-free decisionmaking. Representatives of
minorities may develop unconscious racist tendencies against their own
group.160 As Justice Marshall stated in his concurrence in Castaneda v.
Partida,'6' minority group members in power often dissociate them-
selves from the minority in an attempt to become more like members of
the dominant group.6 2 Therefore, instead of using their power to fight
discrimination, minority representatives may adopt negative attitudes
toward less powerful members of their own group that are similar to the
attitudes of the dominant group.'
Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). The planned landfill would receive refuse from
counties within a 150-mile radius of the site. The court, which held that no equal protection viola-
tion took place, made note of the fact that two of the five decisionmakers were black and both
voted in favor of the siting proposal. Id. at 1146, 1148.
159. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 135 (cited in note 63) (stating that "the duty of repre-
sentation that lies at the core of our system requires more than a voice and a vote").
160. This can be explained by reference to the social dominance theory. Blacks who achieve
material or political success experience frustration because their movement into higher-status caste
groups is hindered by their skin color. They notice that whites who achieve the same degree of
success encounter less resistance, on both institutional and individual levels, to their upward
movement. The successful blacks unconsciously try to shed the restriction on their movement by
dissociating themselves from their black culture and assimilating to the white hegemonic culture.
This phenomenon causes successful blacks to treat other blacks with the same hegemonic superior-
ity complex that they have experienced from whites. See discussion and sources cited in Part II.B.
Alternatively it can be explained as a reaction among successful blacks to affirmative action. See
discussion in note 163.
161. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
162. Id. at 504 (Marshall concurring).
163. Id. See generally Harry Edwards, Black Students (Free Press, 1970). Edwards argues
that successful blacks have refrained from championing the cause of their race because they "often
[feel] insecure about and protective of their newly won liberation from the shackles of abject pov-
erty or traditional welfarism." Id. at 8. He also says that these blacks suspect, "not without some
justification," that the success which they enjoy is made possible by the tolerance of whites as
much as by their own hard work. Id. Therefore, he continues, middle-class blacks develop feelings
of superiority toward lower-class blacks, yet feel inferior to whites. Id. But see Bell, Race, Racism,
and American Law at 245 n.9, 249 (cited in note 142). In 1980, Professor Bell argued that Mar-
shall's suggestion in Castaneda was still valid, but that his sources are outdated. Bell suggested
that modern blacks are more likely to see discrimination as the product of white racism rather
than black inferiority, which would cause a greater likelihood that black jurors would identify with
black defendants. Id.
While blacks may no longer see themselves as inferior, blacks still may tend to dissociate
themselves from their race when in a position of authority. Professor Bell has stated recently that
the belief that strict racial equality is the solution to racial discrimination has perpetuated black
disempowerment. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. at 363 (cited in note 54). This belief has
given rise to a movement of political conservatism among successful blacks who "may feel dismin-
ished by the notion that they got where they are because of affirmative action.... [Black conserva-
tives] are really trying to affirm that their status is the result of a fair fight." Julianne Malveaux,
Why Are the Black Conservatives All Men?, Ms. 60, 60-61 (Mar./Apr. 1991), cited in Bell, 24
Conn. L. Rev. at 370 n.22. See also Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing Reality at 31
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Additionally, black representatives who are technically involved in
the process may be excluded from the real decisionmaking.6 4 Nominal
participation by blacks in the decisionmaking process does not necessa-
rily protect blacks from racial discrimination. Only when blacks have
good faith representation and access to all parts of the decisionmaking
process can one conclude with certainty that the process did not dis-
criminate against them.
165
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION AND ITS CAUSES
Environmental discrimination, or environmental racism, describes
the nationwide phenomenon that minority neighborhoods bear a dis-
proportionately large environmental burden compared to whites and
the exclusion of minorities from the environmental decisionmaking pro-
cess.a' This correlation between minority neighborhoods and hazardous
waste sites is particularly disturbing since such sites may pose serious
dangers to nearby residents.
6 7
(cited in note 42) (noting that affirmative action programs have the consequence of perpetuating
the notion that minorities are less qualified than whites). Bell offers Supreme Court Justice Clar-
ence Thomas as an example of a black conservative. Bell, 24 Conn. L. Rev. at 370.
164. See, for example, the discussion of the California Waste Management Board and South
Central Los Angeles in Part V.B.
165. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 98 (cited in note 63).
166. See generally Toxic Wastes and Race (cited in note 71)
167. See Siting Non-Radioactive Hazardous Waste Management Facilities: An Overview 6
(Keystone Center, Sept. 1980) (saying that "[e]ven with the best standards, technology, manage-
ment, and enforcement, each hazardous waste management site will have some residual risk"),
quoted in David Morell and Christopher Magorian, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities: Local Op-
position and the Myth of Preemption at 62 (Ballinger, 1982). See, for example, Jane Kay, Minori-
ties Bear the Brunt of Pollution, San Francisco Chronicle Al, A12 (April 6, 1991) (reporting that
the California zip code which receives more hazardous chemical releases than any other in the
state is 59% black and 38% Latino). For in-depth description of the health hazards that toxic
wastes can cause, see Staff of Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., Health Effects of Toxic Pollution (Comm. Print, 1980) (describing physical health hazards);
Michael R. Greenberg and Richard F. Anderson, Hazardous Waste Sites: The Credibility Gap 88-
99 (Center for Urban Policy Research, 1984) (same); Dennis Peck, ed., Psychosocial Effects of
Hazardous Toxic Waste Disposal on Communities 81 (Thomas, 1989) (describing mental health
hazards).
Toxins from an environmental hazard can escape into the atmosphere, dissolve into human
bodies upon contact, contaminate land, cause fires and explosions, or seep into local ground water.
Albert L. Weaver, Techniques for Hazardous Chemical and Waste Spill Control at III-1 to 111-4
(Weaver, 1982). People can be directly exposed to a toxin, or indirectly by ingesting contaminated
fish, meat, or vegetation. For example, after Olin Chemical Company shut down its DDT manufac-
turing plant in northern Alabama, authorities discovered that the substance had leachated into
Indian Creek, where many of the residents of the black community of Triana fished for sustenance.
The United States Army tested fish from the Creek and found DDT in levels that were 100 times
in excess the safe exposure amount; the Tennessee Valley Authority found even higher levels in
fish taken from the Triana residents' freezers. Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class,
and Environmental Quality 19-20 (Westview, 1990).
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A substantial amount of evidence shows that environmental dis-
crimination is a national phenomenon.6 8 In 1987, the United Church of
Christ Commission for Social Justice conducted a nationwide demo-
graphic study to determine the percentage of blacks living near hazard-
ous and uncontrolled toxic waste facilities.16 9 The Commission's study
found that three out of five American blacks and Latinos lived in com-
munities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites170 and that four times as
many minorities lived in areas with uncontrolled toxic waste sites than
For black and minority neighborhoods, these health risks are exacerbated by the fact that
American minorities generally have lower health status than American whites. See generally [1
Executive Summary] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report of the Secretary's
Task Force on Black and Minority Health (1985).
Additionally, when community residents perceive that racism is behind a siting decision, that
perception itself may have its own harmful effect. See C.A. Armistead, et al., Relationship of Ra-
cial Stressors to Blood Pressure Responses and Anger Expressions in Black College Students, 8
Health Psych. 541 (1989) (explaining experiment results that showed exposure to racism caused
high rates of hypertension among blacks). Armistead's study further showed that exposure to
nonracist negative situations had no such effect on blacks, indicating that racism causes unique
injury and stress. See generally Deborah A. Byrne and Gary Kiger, The Effect of Prejudice-Reduc-
tion Simulation on Attitude Change, 20 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 341, 354 (1990) (noting that par-
ticipants in discrimination-simulation workshops experience a great deal of stress throughout the
experiment).
Finally, environmental hazards cause property values near the site to decrease, adding insult
to injury. See Greenberg and Anderson, Hazardous Waste Sites at 99-101; Lawrence S. Bacow and
James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachu-
setts Approach, 6 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. 265, 268 (1982).
168. Of ten studies that compared race and income in terms of their significance regarding
the location of environmental hazards in this country, seven concluded that race was more signifi-
cant. Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Fac-
tors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 921, 926, Table 1 (1992).
The six most recent of these studies all found race was more significant. Id. Further, all three of
the above studies that examined national, as opposed to state or city, data, concluded in favor of
race. Id.
169. See Toxic Wastes and Race (cited in note 71). The United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) conducted the first attempt to study environmental racism. U.S. General Accounting
Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with the Racial and Socio-
Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (GAOIRCED-83-168, June 1983). The GAO con-
centrated on four communities in the Southeastern United States that were near hazardous waste
landfills. The GAO found that blacks were the majority population in three of the four communi-
ties studied.
In 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice issued Toxic Wastes and
Race, which consisted of two demographic studies. The first dealt with off-site commercial hazard-
ous *waste facilities, which store wastes from third parties. Toxic Wastes and Race at xii; the sec-
ond looked at uncontrolled toxic waste sites, which are closed, abandoned, and considered by EPA
to pose a substantial threat to health and the environment. Id. at 3.
170. Id. at 13. For example, in Memphis, Tennessee, which has the greatest number of such
waste sites in the country (173), blacks make up 43.3% of the population in the metropolitan area.
Id. at 19, Table 2. In Atlanta, Georgia, where there are 90 such sites, blacks make up 46.6% of the
metropolitan area's population. Id. These figures are particularly staggering in light of the fact that
blacks only comprised 11.7% of the population when the Toxic Wastes and Race study was con-
ducted. Id. at 19, Table 2.
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lived in areas without such sites.17 1 With respect to commercial hazard-
ous waste facilities, the study found minorities were five times more
likely to live in communities with such facilities than in communities
without them.17 2 The state of California has three waste facilities that
will accept nearly any kind of toxic waste; all three facilities are located
in predominantly Latino and black communities.173
Large cities, with their relatively high minority populations, 74 are
common places to find environmental racism at work. For example, in
Houston, Texas, seven of eight city-operated waste incinerators and all
five city landfills are located in predominantly black areas;' 75 in Detroit,
Michigan, a 1990 study showed that forty-four percent of the residents
living within a mile of a commercial hazardous waste facility were
black, while only fifteen percent of those living more than one and a
half miles away were black.
76
Like segregation and disfranchisement, state-sanctioned acts of en-
vironmental discrimination cause harm to blacks in order to benefit
whites.'7 7 Yet because instances of environmental discrimination gener-
ally fall into the aversive and institutional categories of racism, the
traditional features of racial discrimination are hard to pinpoint. For
example, the decision to locate a hazardous waste facility in a predomi-
171. See id. at 16. The study defines minorities as blacks, Latinos, Asians/Pacific Islanders,
and American Indians. Id. at xiv.
In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 97% of the black population lives near an uncontrolled toxic
waste facility. In contrast, only 45.7% of the city's white population lives near such a facility.
Similarly, in Flint, Michigan, 95.3% of the black population, as opposed to 44% of the white popu-
lation, live near uncontrolled waste facilities. Id. at 20, Table 3.
172. Id. at 16. Los Angeles County, California, for example, has 14 active commercial sites
within its borders, and 46.7% of its population consists of minorities. Id., Table B-9, at 48. In the
parts of Los Angeles that actually contain the sites, the minority populations are generally much
higher. For example, the Lugo and Hazard areas of the county, which contain one site each, have
minority populations in excess of 95%. Id. Nine of the remaining facilities are located in areas with
minority populations ranging from 58.9% to 79%. Id.
Another example, not noted in Toxic Wastes and Race, is Richmond, California, where half of
the population of 100,000 is black. Richmond hosts 350 industrial facilities that handle hazardous
chemicals. These facilities emit 210 known toxic substances into the air, water and ground. Dick
Russell, Environmental Racism, 11 Amicus J. 22, 25 (Natural Resources Def. Council, Spring 1989)
(recounting information from a February 1989 report by Citizens for a Better Environment).
173. Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View From the
Field, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1991, 1992 (1992).
174. Toxic Wastes and Race at 18 (noting that 60% of black Americans live in inner cities).
175. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 50-54 (cited in note 167).
176. Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Inequities and the Inner City (oral
presentation), delivered at the Sixth Annual Technological Literacy Conference of the National
Ass'n for Science, Technology & Society (1991), cited in Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environ-
mental Racism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 394, 395 n.9 (1991).
177. See Bacow and Milkey, 6 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 268 (stating that "[tihe social costs
associated with hazardous waste facilities fall most heavily on those who live nearby[;] the dis-
persed benefits ... accrue to the entire region served by the facility").
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nantly black neighborhood often will affect some whites as well. Accord-
ingly, the disproportionate number of environmental hazards near black
and minority neighborhoods does not, by itself, establish racial discrim-
ination. To determine whether racism is truly the cause of this phenom-
enon, it is necessary to understand the social and political factors that
allow the phenomenon to occur. These factors include the concentration
and isolation of minorities in particular neighborhoods, the nature of
state waste facility siting processes, and the amount of real political
representation that minorities have in siting decisions.
A. Racially Segregated Neighborhoods
Blacks and minorities have limited options when it comes to choos-
ing a home. 178 Lower-income minorities can only afford to live in hous-
ing projects, which virtually prevents them from leaving the inner
cities: these projects are almost always constructed in inner cities be-
cause of suburban zoning restrictions and political pressures.' Blacks
with greater economic power still are limited by private market restric-
tions on their choice of neighborhood. For example, many real estate
dealers will not show black customers houses for sale in wealthy white
neighborhoods.180 Excluding minorities from white neighborhoods keeps
land values high.
Not only are blacks and minorities concentrated in certain neigh-
borhoods, but these neighborhoods may be isolated from nearby white
communities by other factors. In many areas, highway construction pro-
178. Blacks and minorities are limited in their housing choices by racial discrimination more
than by economics. Nancy A. Dutton and Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation of Blacks,
Hispanics and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 797 (1988) (noting
U.S. Census Bureau data that showed racial segregation was just as significant when controlling for
other factors such as income, education, and occupation status levels, and concluding that race
limited blacks mobility more than income). See Perry, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 581 (cited in note 155)
(saying that "poverty makes it difficult to escape racially isolated neighborhoods, and racial isola-
tion makes it difficult to escape poverty").
179. While the Supreme Court has struck down racially restrictive covenants, Shelly v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), it has upheld the powers of suburban communities to prohibit low-income
housing projects in their neighborhoods via referendum. See, for example, James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (holding that a state constitutional amendment mandating that public bodies
get the approval of a majority of voters before building a low-rent housing project in their commu-
nity did not rest on racial distinctions and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). See
also Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986).
180. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair Housing Enforcement Dem-
onstration (U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and Research, 1983)
23-28, 37-44. HUD tested rental markets in various United States cities for racial discrimination.
HUD would send out independently two groups of apartment seekers, one white and one minority,
to inquire about rental opportunities at certain complexes. The experiments showed that whites
were much more likely to be invited to see a model unit, while blacks often were told no vacancies
were available. See also Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law § 8.1 at 475 (cited in note 142).
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grams have placed higher physical barriers between these neighbor-
hoods and the rest of the city.lsl Also, school desegregation plans in the
1970s did not require suburban school districts to participate in the de-
segregation of predominantly black urban school systems,1 82 further
preventing urban blacks from making their way into the suburbs.
1 83
Since more poor blacks than poor whites live in lower-income, inner-
city neighborhoods,"8 4 the isolation of these neighborhoods generally af-
fects blacks more adversely than whites. Further, lower-income whites
living in economically varied areas benefit from the greater political in-
fluence that the middle class in those neighborhoods possess.1 8 5 Politi-
cal clout does not trickle down to the strictly lower-income areas,
however, making these neighborhoods even more vulnerable to the po-
litical system.
B. Thq Environmental Hazard Siting Process
The siting processes in place in most areas further allow for envi-
ronmental discrimination to occur. Since the federal government hardly
regulates the siting of environmental hazards, state and local govern-
ments retain a great deal of flexibility in structuring their siting deci-
sionmaking processes. States accordingly can set up processes that
exclude blacks from the decisionmaking and deny affected residents
complete information about the health effects the facility will have
181. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie 7 (cited in note 167); Larry Ford and Ernest Griffin, The
Ghettoization of Paradise, Geographical Rev. 69, 140-58 (April 1979).
182. See, for example, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (striking down a plan
for interdistrict desegregation because the outlying suburban districts did not cause the segregative
effects in the urban district).
183. Professor Bell has said that Milliken "allayed middle-class fears that the school bus
would become the Trojan Horse of their suburban Troys." Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law
at 399 (cited in note 142).
184. Recent census figures show that 70.9% of poor urban blacks are concentrated in poverty
areas, while only 40% of poor urban whites live in those areas. U.S. Dep't of Commerce Bureau of
Census, Series P-60, No. 171, Poverty in the United States: 1988 and 1989 at 4 (1991). The Census
Bureau defines "poverty areas" as census tracts with poverty rates of 20% or more. Id. at 4 n.4.
Furthermore, 54.8% of all urban blacks lived in poverty areas, compared to only 16.7% of urban
whites. Id. at 4-5.
185. See William J. Kruvant, People, Energy and Pollution, in Dorothy K. Newman and
Dawn Day, eds., The American Energy Consumer 166 (Ballinger, 1975). Kruvant argues:
[D]isadvantaged people are largely victims of middle- and upper-class pollution because they
usually live closest to the sources of pollution-power plants, industrial installations, and in
central cities where vehicle traffic is heaviest... Discrimination created the situation, and
those with wealth and influence have the political power to keep polluting facilities away from
their homes.
Id. See also Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 399 (cited in note 176).
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upon their neighborhoods. 188 These procedural disadvantages create sit-
uations that facilitate racially discriminatory decisionmaking.
A look at various states' hazardous waste facility site decisionmak-
ing processes illustrates how the environmental hazard siting process
can engender discriminatory results. Until the mid-1970s, the federal
government did not regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes at all. 
1 7
In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) to regulate newly generated solid and hazardous wastes.1 88
RCRA delegates to the states the responsibility for locating solid and
hazardous waste sites and authorizes them to initiate their own hazard-
ous waste programs. 189 For existing sites, RCRA mandates that the
state conduct compliance inspections for commercial facilities every two
years 90 and for government-operated facilities annually.9 The results
of these inspections are to become part of the public record.9 2 RCRA,
however, offers very little procedural guidance as to how the states
should make their placement decisions in the first place. It merely
states a policy objective-to minimize threats to health and the envi-
ronment. 9" This policy objective is tempered by an EPA rule that does
186. Unless affected minorities are included meaningfully in the decisionmaking process, the
decisionmakers likely will underevaluate the health concerns at stake, possibly because minority
lives are not considered as valuable as white lives. See discussion at notes 14-27. For example, in
1982, North Carolina decided to build a landfill to hold more than 30,000 gallons of
polychlorinated biphenyls, a dangerous toxin, in a community which was 84% black. Bullard,
Dumping in Dixie at 36-37 (cited in note 167). The state made this decision despite EPA discour-
agement and scientific data indicating that the water table in the area was too shallow to host the
landfill safely. Id. While less risky storage methods, such as incineration and on-site neutralization,
were available to'dispose of the toxins, the landfill was chosen because it was the least expensive.
Id. at 38 (citing oral remarks of EPA official William Sanjour). See Nicholas Freudenberg, Citizen
Action for Environmental Health: Report on a Survey of Community Organizations, 74 Am. J.
Public Health 444 (1984). In a survey of 110 community groups, 88% said that they perceived
obstacles to obtaining health information about environmental problems; 45% stated the govern-
ment agencies caused these obstacles. Id. at 444-48.
187. The absence of regulation until the mid-1970s created an economic disincentive for
waste disposers to consider any factors beyond cost in their disposal decisions. See Greenberg and
Anderson, Hazardous Waste Sites at 36 (cited in note 167). Up until the late 1970s, 80% to 90%
of hazardous waste was disposed without adequate health and environmental precautions. Id. at
31. While Congress had enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act in 1965, this Act merely declared
that improper waste disposal created a hazard to public health. Solid Waste Disposal Act §
202(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965).
188. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1992)).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
190. Id. § 6927(e).
191. Id. § 6927(c),(d).
192. Id. § 6927(b)(1).
193. Id. § 6902(b) (declaring a national policy that waste storage and disposal should "mini-
mize the present and future threat to human health and the environment").
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not allow the states to set up prohibitively restrictive standards. 9 4 Sub-
ject only to these guidelines, states and local communities are virtually
free to approach waste facility siting any way they choose.
One of the most common site approval methods is the "super re-
view" model, which provides that the permit applicant may choose a
potential site for the facility.195 The applicant then submits a site pro-
posal, along with relevant environmental data, to a state agency for en-
vironmental impact review.1 98 If the proposal passes agency muster, the
agency sends it to a panel of scientists and land-use experts. The panel
usually includes some representatives from the affected community.
19 7
The local input is designed to promote informed community discussion
and minimize reactionary opposition, which can stall a siting at the ex-
pense of expediency.' 8 Nevertheless, organized opposition can block a
siting proposal in the super review model. Accordingly, applicants have
incentives to seek out minority neighborhoods because they have less
clout.' ,99
A similar site approval approach, the "site designation" model, in-
vests a state agency instead of developers with the responsibility to de-
velop a list of possible sites. 00 Placing discretion in the hands of a state
agency does not remove the potential for discrimination, however, be-
cause agency officials also have incentives to choose communities that
cannot mount effective opposition.20 1 For example, many regulators'
194. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (1992).
195. The super review model is used primarily in Eastern and Midwestern states. See, for
example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-119 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); 38 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
1319-R(3) (West Supp. 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-285.13 (1992); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §
27-1105 (McKinney Supp. 1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 13-7-8.6-3 (Burns 1990); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-
3433 (1992); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 299.517 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3734.05(C) (Baldwin 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 144.44(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1992).
196. See Brain D.E. Canter, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New State Siting Programs,
14 Nat. Resources Law 421, 438 (1982); Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 403-05 (cited in note 176).
197. Canter, 14 Nat. Resources Law at 449; Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 404.
198. Canter, 14 Nat. Resources Law at 449-52; Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 404-05. Godsil
points out that the super review model also includes a state preemption provision, which allows the
state to override local political and statutory opposition to a siting. Id. at 404. This does not render
the local opposition powerless, however. It still can litigate, lobby state government, or intimidate
the developers with demonstrations and negative publicity. Id. at 405.
Two states with super review-type models do not allow for state preemption. See Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 25147 (West 1992); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.723(2) (West 1986). This approach con-
dones "NIMBY," or "Not In My Back Yard," opposition. Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 407.
199. See the discussion in Part IV.C.
200. See Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 3-701 to 3-710 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
115A.09 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
201. See the discussion of the trash incinerator proposed for South Central Los Angeles in
Part V.B. See also Theresa Moore, Minority Groups Rally to Protest EPA 'Bias,' San Francisco
Chronicle A14 (Aug. 1, 1991). An environmental justice organization alleged that the regional San
Francisco EPA office had ignored the adverse effect toxic substances have had upon health in
minority neighborhoods. Id. The group pointed to high rates of cancer found among teenage
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post-agency career opportunities depend on the connections they make
while in office.2 0 Since the most advantageous connections will be indi-
viduals with power and privilege, an agency official would be acting
against her own self-interests by pursuing unpopular policies against
these individuals. Also, since an agency often does not have the re-
sources to conduct its own independent investigations, it often will have
to rely on information supplied by wealthy interest groups. 203 This reli-
ance generates a situation where government essentially adopts the pri-
orities of the wealthy, even though these often will not reflect the
priorities of the whole constituency.204 Thus, the site designation model
allows the politically connected to capture the agency and convince it to
choose less influential neighborhoods to host waste facilities.
A third site approval model requires that the host community be
compensated financially. 05 The theory behind this approach is that
compensation will decrease the amount of local opposition to the facil-
ity by paying the community for bearing the environmental burden.206
Navajos living near uranium spills, high levels of lead poisoning among inner-city black children,
and birth defects in children born to Latino farmworkers that are exposed to pesticides. Id.
202. For an example on the federal level, former EPA head William K. Reilly was nominated
to the board of directors of DuPont Co. less than two months after leaving office. Business Briefs,
Houston Chronicle 5 (March 18, 1993) (noting that DuPont has been called "the nation's biggest
producer of toxic wastes"). For a state-level example, John J. Farrell, former member of Connecti-
cut's Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, left his administrative post to become an adviser
for KPMG Peat Marwick to help develop a state-side health care facilities plan for the hospitals
commission. Craig W. Baggott, Attempt to Suppress Ethics Panel's Finding Backfires, Hartford
Courant C7 (March 9, 1993). Farrell is currently before an ethics commission for violating the
state's revolving door prohibition against former state agency officials working for a private em-
ployer on agency-related matters within one year of leaving the agency. Id. Compare Norman J.
Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking 60 (Congressional Quar-
terly, 1978) (noting that congressional lobbyists are often former legislators, and that they are
particularly influential because of the personal friendships they developed with the existing legisla-
tors during their common service); id. at 82 (saying that "[tio maximize access and to enhance
their 'inside' contacts, interest groups will employ former members of Congress, former staff aides,
or old 'Washington hands' ").
203. See Macey, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 251 (cited in note 157) (noting that "special interest
groups often control the flow of information to lawmakers" and that legislators may rely on this
information and "pass statutes that [they believe] are unambiguously in the public interest, but
. . . in fact are riddled with incidental benefits to interest groups"); Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562,
577 (1992). While this information-gathering technique may suffice when interested groups from
both sides of the issue participate, it necessarily biases the decisionmakers when only one party to
the debate has access.
204. Id. (saying that "the orderly administration of programs sometimes can disintegrate into
a regulatory bazaar, with legislators and administrative managers responding to whichever combi-
nations of political, beneficiary-group, and media pressures make the most noise," leading the
agency to "strain at the gnat while ignoring the camel"). Id.
205. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. § 12-8-39 (Michie 1992); Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21D
§ 12 (West 1992); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.25 (Baldwin 1989); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.77 (1989).
206. Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 407 (cited in note 176).
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While this solution may have economic appeal if it generated an effi-
cient result-that is, if the community were compensated enough so
that it was at least indifferent to hosting the facility""-the compensa-
tion model rarely achieves efficiency. Compensation statutes are not
designed to pay the host communities enough to compensate them
fully, as they do not account for the health costs that the facilities may
create for nearby residents.208
Some compensation models permit a community to accept or reject
an offer. This does not necessarily solve the problem for minority com-
munities, however: willingness to accept payment is not an accurate
measure of preferences of people with different levels of wealth.209 Com-
munities with depressed economies are more easily persuaded to accept
a facility proposal that promises to provide badly needed employment
and economic development to the area.2 10 This economic reality is not
207. See, for example, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
Professor Coase argued that competing parties with adverse interests in a single resource would
negotiate an efficient result, provided there was perfect competition. Id. at 6. Of course, if the costs
of hosting the facility were greater than the benefits derived by the developer, the parties would
not reach an agreement. In this case, the developer should increase the charges imposed on the
individuals who ultimately benefit from the hazard, such as those communities who ship their
waste to the facility.
Even if an efficient result were reached, moral issues may still linger. The compensation model
presumes that it is not unjust for the wealthy to pay the lower class to shoulder all the health and
safety risks associated with hazardous waste disposal. Some scholars have criticized this presump-
tion as amoral. See, for example, Herman Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis
Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in Douglas MacLean, ed., Values at Risk 31, 42-
43 (Rowman & Allanheld, 1986), stating:
Few important social decisions cannot and should not be informed by cost-benefit analysis.
But we would not promote cost-benefit analysis as the final arbiter of social decisions. Some
issues are of such great social concern that no analysis can override them.
See also Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 91 (cited in note 167).
208. See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-132 (West Supp. 1992) (determining com-
pensation by looking at gross receipts or volume of wastes processed at the facility, not be examin-
ing health risks); Ga. Code Ann. § 12-8-39 (Michie 1992) (authorizing host community to tax
facility developers for compensation, not mentioning health costs); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.25
(Baldwin 1989) (requiring state agency to make incentive payments to the host community, not
mentioning health costs).
209. Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. Legal Stud. 225,
247 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 387, 401-03 (1981).
210. See Toxic Wastes and Race at 7 (cited in note 71). A common strategy for developers is
to coax the support of low-income communities with promises that the facility will bring jobs and
economic revitalization to the depressed neighborhood. See Harvey L. Molotch, The City as a
Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economic of Place, 82 Am. J. Sociology 320 (1976) (discuss-
ing generally economic growth proposals to disadvantaged communities). Political and industrial
leaders can attract minority leaders "by flashing dollar signs" and deemphasizing the potential
long-term health impacts on the target community. Kelly M. Colquette and Elizabeth A.H. Rob-
ertson, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 Tul. Envir. L.
J. 153, 174 (1991). The mere use of risk-assessment analyses, cost assessments, and best available
technology data by developers in a negotiating scenario "serves to intimidate, confuse, and over-
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by itself unfair, provided that the developer informs the community of
the health and safety risks that would accompany the facility. Fre-
quently, however, the community's residents do not discover the health
risks involved until the facility has been built, at which point they have
little bargaining power.
Several factors contribute to a community's lack of health informa-
tion. First, there is a lack of scientific data about the health and envi-
ronmental effects of exposure to many substances.211 Second, the
developer often will be the only party with access to health information.
Even if the information is public, many less-educated people might not
know where to look to get the information. 12 Third, no objective moni-
toring of the negotiation process occurs.213 The last two factors are ag-
gravated by the fact that blacks do not receive much assistance from
environmental organizations in learning the relevant facts behind a sit-
ing decision.2 14
whelm" the community residents. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 107 (cited in note 167). This
makes the bargaining process even more uneven.
211. See Robert V. Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science and Policy 427-
34 (Little, Brown 1992) (reprinting Conservation Foundation, State of the Environment: A View
Toward the Nineties 136 (1987)). William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Future of Federal Solid Waste
Regulation, 16 Colum. J. Envir. L. 109, 120 (1991).
212. Community activists have reported that acquiring health information is difficult. Toxic
Wastes and Race at 7 (cited in note 71) (reporting results of survey of 110 community groups
indicating that 88% perceived obstacles to obtaining relevant information and 45% claimed that
governmental agencies obstructed them in their quest for information). While measures such as
the public access provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, Title III, § 323, 100 Stat. 1750 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (Supp. 1992)),
make some information available, the Act is not very helpful in the case of environmental discrimi-
nation because it does not require entities to predict how much they will pollute at a proposed
facility site. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-23. Thus, concerned residents would not get information about
the type or amount of the facility's pollution through these provisions until after the facility was
built.
213. See Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Jus-
tice, 15 B.C. Envir. Aff. L. Rev. 437, 448 (1988) (saying a negotiation and compensation scheme has
not worked in Massachusetts in part because of a failure to provide for substantive review of facil-
ity proposals).
214. The environmentalist movement in this country historically has involved upper-middle-
class whites and has concentrated on the preservation of wildlife and wilderness areas. See Bullard,
Dumping in Dixie at 1, 11 (cited in note 167). Black activists, for their part, generally have been
more concerned with immediate racial problems such as employment discrimination. Toxic Wastes
and Race at 6 (cited in note 71); Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 4 (noting that black student activ-
ists and university faculty members have not responded to racism in the environmental context).
See also Renee Loth, Bringing Earth Day Back Down to Earth: Grass-Roots Activists Tweak
'Elitist' Brethren, Boston Globe A33 (April 21, 1991) (stating that in 1990 the ten largest environ-
mental organizations had a total of 137 board members, only five of whom were minorities); A
Place at the Table: A Sierra Roundtable on Race, Justice, and the Environment, Sierra 51 (May/




Once the facility has been built, the facility owners can use any
employment or economic benefits that the facility does provide for the
area as leverage if residents begin to voice safety concerns.215 If workers
in the facility approach the owners about improving health conditions,
the facility owners may threaten salary cutbacks and plant closings to
pay for the improvements, posing layoffs as a necessary consequence of
health and safety reforms.2 16 Layoff threats are particularly frightening
to unskilled black workers: the large supply of replacement labor and
limited ability to find alternative employment make present employ-
ment a precious commodity.2 17 While a community facing such a Hob-
son's choice could complain to the state, severe cuts in federal funding
to state hazardous waste enforcement programs render state assistance
virtually ineffective.218 Once the facility is in place, residents of these
communities often conclude that the facility hurt them more than it
helped."19
C. The Lack of Real Representation for Minorities
Another problem inherent in environmental hazard siting processes
is the imbalance of political power in favor of more privileged white
communities. Privileged communities are better able to advance their
interests because they have more money, superior information and bet-
ter access to resources and legislative decisionmakers than the dis-
215. That is not to imply that these facilities always bring economic benefits to the host
community. For example, the town of Institute, West Virginia, whose population in 1980 was more
than 90% black. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 81 (cited in note 167). The Union Carbide chemical
plant in Institute hired less than 10% of its workers from the local community. Id. The blacks who
were hired by Union Carbide only received low-paying jobs. Id. The plant contributed little else to
the community. For example, Institute received no tax payments from the plant because Institute
was unincorporated. Id. Interestingly, when county officials held an incorporation election for In-
stitute, the officials drew the town limits so that the plant would not be within the borders, as
requested by Union Carbide, thus preventing the town from collecting property taxes from Union
Carbide. Id.
216. Richard Kazis and Richard L. Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor, and the
Environment 37 (Pilgrim, 1982); Elizabeth Martinez, When People of Color Are Endangered Spe-
cies, Z Magazine 61, 62 (April 1991) (quoting Mike Guerrero and Louis Head of the South West
Organizing Project).
217. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 12 (cited in note 167).
218. U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement
Strategy (GAO/RCED-85-166, September 1985). The Office reported that 25 states lost 63.5% of
their federal funding for hazardous waste enforcement programs. Id.
219. See Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 92, Table 4.5. In a 1988 survey of black residents in
five neighborhoods with dangerous environmental facilities (Emelle, Alabama; West Dallas, Texas;
Alsen, Louisiana; Houston's Northwood Manor, Texas; Institute, West Virginia), only 30% of
those surveyed agreed that the benefits the community derived from the facility far outweighed
the negatives. Id.
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empowered group.220 This greater access stems in part from the promise
of votes and campaign contributions that a well-organized, wealthy
community can offer. 221 Also, through a combination of manipulating
the information and emphasizing the prospect of reelection, a well-
heeled interest group can usually demonstrate that the concentrated
benefits it reaps from a particular decision outweigh the dispersed det-
riment that the disempowered group would suffer.222 The more power-
ful group may also provide selected information to the targeted
disempowered group in order to convince them that the detrimental im-
pact will be minimal and that the targeted group will realize benefits as
well.
A relatively unorganized, unconnected neighborhood, in contrast,
would find it difficult to avail itself of these resources and maneuvers,
and accordingly does not have equal potential to mount effective resis-
tance to a siting proposal.223 Since the environmental hazard needs to
220. Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political Markets 60
(Rutgers, 1981); Regina Austin and Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 Kansas J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 69, 70-
71 (1991) (saying that "[p]olluters know that communities comprised of low-income and working
class people with no more than a high school education are not as effective at marshalling opposi-
tion as communities of middle or upper income people," and that these communities are hampered
by limited time and money resources, a lack of technical, medical, legal, political, and media ac-
cess, and "cultural and ideological indifference or hostility to environmental issues"); Edmund S.
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 659 (1972) (describing a
statistical model that demonstrated that high information costs produce discrimination). See gen-
erally Dorceta E. Taylor, Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanation of the Concern
and Action Gap Between Blacks and Whites, 22 Envt. and Behavior 175 (1989).
221. Austin and Schill, 1 Kansas J. L. & Pub. Pol'y at 70.
222. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators at 58-59 (noting that organized interest groups have a
superior capacity to threaten legislators' chances of reelection because they claim to be able to
deliver blocs of voters, and that legislators often fall to distinguish their constituencies' desires
from the wants of interest groups). The public at'large is a prime example of the unorganized
group. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guaranty Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4 & n.18 (1988) (noting that "federal ... administrators may
be more responsive to special interest groups and lobbyists than to the majority's will" because the
majority is so diffuse). The public often bears the burdens imposed by special interest legislation.
See Macey, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 232-33 & n.47 (cited in note 157) (noting that legislators have
incentives to focus on legislation that benefits well-organized special interest groups at the expense
of the general public, especially legislation that appears to advance public purposes but in fact
serves special interests).
This public choice model also applies to environmental hazard siting decisions, where organ-
ized, well-informed, resource-rich, politically connected neighborhood groups benefit from sitings
of facilities in unorganized, uninformed, resource-lacking, politically powerless areas. See the dis-
cussion of process defects in Part IV.B.
223. See Morell and Magorian, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities at 64, 66, 89 (cited in note
167) (stating that the effectiveness of local opposition depends on the underlying social and eco-
nomic cohesiveness of the community). To mount an effective campaign against a siting proposal, a
neighborhood must invest a great deal of time, money, and political influence, and must have
access to the media, meeting places, public and private records, technical experts and researchers.
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be placed somewhere, the decisionmaking often will choose minority
neighborhoods because the chances of upsetting powerful groups who
can generate unfavorable press and jeopardize reelection hopes are
greatly reduced. In fact, privileged neighborhoods likely would not have
to wield their political influence at all: decisionmakers often will choose
minority neighborhoods on the basis of the generally accurate percep-
tion that those residents are politically powerless, uneducated and lack-
ing in financial resources.224
V. THE SOLUTION: INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL SCRUTINY FOR ALL STATE
ACTIONS WITH A SIGNIFICANT DISPARATE IMPACT ON SUSPECT CLASSES
A. The Focus of an Intermediate-Level Scrutiny Standard
Blacks and other disadvantaged groups have little recourse against
aversive, institutional racism under current equal protection law be-
cause of the intent standard.225 In equal protection cases alleging envi-
ronmental discrimination, the courts uniformly have ruled in favor of
the defendants because the plaintiffs could not prove the requisite in-
tent.2 6 This result is particularly unfortunate because the challenged
siting decisions in these cases contained significant evidence of racial
discrimination that was not properly considered 2 7 and because victims
of environmental discrimination have no alternative legal remedy
available.228
Colquette and Robertson, 5 Tul. Envir. L. J. at 168 (cited in note 210). This necessarily implies
that the neighborhood must have strong economic, educational and political clout.
224. See, for example, Senate Select Committee Hearing on Equal Educational Opportunity,
Part 5; De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination 2966 (Sept. 1, 1970) (comments of
Anthony Downs) (stating that many whites associate blacks and Latinos with lower-class economic
status).
225. Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 408 (cited in note 176); Cole, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 1992-93
(cited in note 173).
226. See, for example, Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metropolitan Nashville, No. 390-0214
(M.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 12, 1990) (denying a preliminary injunction in a case alleging improper
supervision of a solid waste landfill located in a predominantly black area); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,
768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that a county's decision to place a regional waste
facility in a predominantly black neighborhood was based on economic and not discriminatory
grounds and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood
Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989),
aft'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's decision to allow a private landfill to
be built in a census tract that was more than 60% black did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because plaintiffs did not prove discriminatory intent); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgm't
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying a
preliminary injunction for lack of evidence of discriminatory intent).
227. See, for example, East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 882-83 (noting that the defendants
originally denied the landfill permit because of the proximity to a residential area, but approved it
on rehearing). See also the discussion in Part V.C.
228. Cole, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 1992 (cited in note 173); Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 408 (cited
in note 176). Godsil suggests creating a federal statutory cause of action to serve as a remedy for
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This Part suggests that the courts abandon the intent standard and
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to all legislative decisions that
have a substantial disparate impact on suspect classes such as blacks.229
This approach, as detailed below, would reflect the understanding that
racial discrimination may be unconscious and aversive as well as con-
scious and dominative. The focus, therefore, would not be on whether
the decisionmakers intended to discriminate but on whether the struc-
ture of the decisionmaking process was likely to generate the disparate
racial outcome.
Under an intermediate-level scrutiny approach, plaintiffs first
would have to demonstrate that the government act had a significant
disparate impact on a suspect class.2 30 Plaintiffs could meet this burden
environmental discrimination. See id. at 421-25. There are several reasons why restructuring equal
protection analysis is preferable to enacting a statute. First, the statute proposed by Godsil is
limited to environmental racism. While her proposal has the advantage of legislative as opposed to
judicial origin, it would not address other instances of aversive racism. Since environmental dis-
crimination only constitutes a small part of aversive racial discrimination, this shortcoming is un-
acceptable. If, on the other hand, Congress expanded the statute to cover all cases of aversive
racism and required that the courts apply, as this author suggests, an intermediate level scrutiny
model, it would almost inevitably leave substantial gaps for the federal courts to fill with common
law. See, for example, Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (laying out a four-part test to determine
when a couit may imply a private cause of action in a statute that does not expressly provide for
one); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (saying that courts have the
power to create federal common law with respect to rights under ERISA plans because the legisla-
tive history indicates that ERISA was meant to codify trust law). In such a case, the perceived
democratic advantage of having the legislature make policy decisions disappears. At the same time,
the courts are in a position to fashion exceptions to the equal protection standard when presented
with circumstances that warrant them; a legislature would have to be clairvoyant to include all
necessary exceptions in the original law. Furthermore, less time and money would be needed to
change the equal protection analysis than would be needed if the legislative route were pursued.
See Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America 30 (Yale, 1981). Neely explains quite bluntly:
The reason that people go to court rather than to the political process to get the law changed
is that courts are much cheaper. To make an impression on politicians, except at the local
level, it is necessary either to elect one's own man or to organize thousands or millions of
voters; to make an impression on courts requires nothing more than a good case and the
comparatively small sum of money to hire a lawyer.
Id. In addition, if legislative and administrative preference for privileged special interests at the
hands of minorities is what drives environmental discrimination, it seems the same influences
would dilute the efforts to draft a federal prohibition.
Of course, judicial reform in this area is not likely to occur overnight: recent Supreme Court
decisions have been fairly unsympathetic to claims by black plaintiffs. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.
and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Law-
making, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 640-42 (1992). Still the circuit courts have the discretion to inter-
pret the intent standard loosely enough to accord a state action de facto intermediate-level
scrutiny. See note 128.
229. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 31 (cited in note 62).
230. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 624 n.15
(1983) (Stevens dissenting). Cf. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60
(1989) (stating that plaintiffs bringing Title VII actions bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the disparate racial impact issue).
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by showing that the act disadvantaged an inordinately large number or
percentage of class members. A putative defendant could rebut plain-
tiffs' argument by showing that a substantial number or percentage of
nonsuspect class members also were affected. In evaluating the persua-
siveness of the defendant's proof, a court should be aware that institu-
tionalized discriminatory acts are almost necessarily overinclusive
because overt discrimination is no longer legal; thus, acts motivated by
institutional discrimination often will affect a sizeable number of whites
as well.231 Furthermore, when the evidence of impact is not conclusive,
the court should examine past similar decisions by the government
body to see whether other decisions had disparate racial impacts. If the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden on the disparate impact issue, the
defendants would win.
If the plaintiffs can demonstrate disparate impact, the defendants
then would bear the burden of proving that the affected group's inter-
ests were represented adequately in the decisionmaking process.232
They may make a prima facie showing by demonstrating that represen-
tative members of the minority group were part of the decisionmaking
process and that these representatives were fully informed about the
detriments and risks the decision would bring to bear on class mem-
bers.2 33 The burden then would shift to plaintiffs to show that the rep-
resentation was inadequate or that some other substantial process
defect existed which could have undermined the effectiveness of the
group's representation. Several factors can affect the adequacy of repre-
sentation: the number of minority representatives who were actually
decisionmakers or otherwise substantially part of the decisionmaking
process; whether these representatives were chosen by the affected
groups or by the decisionmakers; the amount of communication be-
231. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text. For example, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971), discussed in notes 96-99 and accompanying text, the city of Jackson's decision to close
all public swimming pools in the face of a desegregation order arguably had no disparate impact on
blacks because whites couldn't swim in the pools either. On the other hand, the pool closings likely
affected the poor more than the rich, since the rich had access to private pools. See 403 U.S. at 235
(Douglas dissenting). This would entail that the closings did disparately affect blacks. Arguably
the lower-class whites who were disadvantaged by the pool closings received consolation from
knowing that the city was maintaining as much separation between the races as the federal govern-
ment would allow. See generally George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study
in American and South African History 87 (Oxford, 1981) (saying that racial privilege serves as
compensation for class disadvantage to lower-class whites).
232. The burden is allocated to defendants because they have better access to evidence. See
notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
233. Compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139-40 (1986) (saying the Court has found
equal protection violations in individual multimember district challenges where a disproporation-




tween the affected parties and the representatives; the completeness
and accuracy of information made available to those affected and their
representatives; the consideration given to less intrusive alternatives;
and whether these representatives had incentives that ran counter to
the interests of the affected group.
2 3 4
The court's finding on the representation issue would not dispose
of the case, but it would determine how carefully the court should scru-
tinize the defendants' decision. If the court finds that the affected
group had adequate representation and was not hampered by process
defects, the state merely must demonstrate that a rational basis for its
decision exists.23 5 On the other hand, if the court found that the process
did not adequately include participation by suspect class representa-
tives, it should carefully scrutinize the decision to see whether defend-
ants had considered sufficiently the interests of those affected. The
court should consider the severity of the disparate impact on the af-
fected group and weigh that impact against the extent of the inade-
quacy of representation and the nature of the government interest at
stake. Given that the plaintiff would lack access to evidence regarding
the decisionmaking process, 23 6 a court should presume that defendant's
decision was discriminatory. The defendant could rebut this presump-
tion with evidence that they considered the affected group's interests
despite the representational inadequacy, or that the government inter-
est was so high as to warrant a lack of representation.3 7 For their part,
the plaintiffs could support their case with any evidence they had show-
ing discrimination in the decisionmaking process, as well as evidence of
a history of actual discrimination by defendants.
This intermediate-level approach would allow the courts to look
beyond the primitive notion of intent to examine whether the decision-
making process sufficiently protected the concerns of affected minori-
ties.13 At the same time, it would not unduly limit the government; the
234. See Part IV.C. See also Macey, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 238 (cited in note 157) (saying that
the judiciary should monitor special interest legislation to guard against legislative excess).
235. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 31 (cited in note 62) (suggesting that judges inde-
pendently review laws which operate to disadvantage certain minority groups or impede the demo-
cratic process).
236. See discussion in notes 69-70, 150-57 and accompanying text.
237. See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 579 (West, 4th ed.
1991) (saying that "[u]nder the intermediate standard of review, the classification must have a
substantial relationship to an important interest of government"). This is similar to the "environ-
mental necessity" aspect of Godsil's proposal. See Godsil, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 424-25 (cited in note
176).
238. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938) (stating
that more exacting judicial scrutiny may be required in cases involving "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"). This statement has been used to
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intermediate test would merely require the government to ensure
greater representation in its decisionmaking processes. Furthermore,
since the courts would take into account the strength of the government
interest, the intermediate-level test still would allow for efficient crisis
decisionmaking when necessary.
An examination of two situations potentially involving environmen-
tal discrimination demonstrates that the intermediate-level approach is
better suited for detecting racial discrimination than the intent stan-
dard. In the first case, discussed in Part IV.B., the intermediate-level
scrutiny approach would result in a in favorable holding for the affected
residents. In the second, discussed in Part IV.C., the intermediate-level
approach would find no equal protection violation, but would conduct a
deeper inquiry than required by the intent standard.
B. South Central Los Angeles and the California Waste
Management Board
In 1984, the California Waste Management Board decided that the
Los Angeles area required new trash-burning facilities to handle its
waste production. 39 The Board hired a demographics consulting firm to
determine which communities would greet the facilities with the least
political resistance. The firm suggested the Board focus on "lower socio-
economic neighborhoods" or "communities that conform to some kind
of economic need criteria. '240 Based on this recommendation, the Board
planned to locate the first incinerator in South Central Los Angeles, a
predominantly low-income, minority neighborhood that had the highest
unemployment rate in the city.
2 41
After deciding to locate the incinerator in South Central, the city
approached Gilbert Lindsay, an aging black city councilman who repre-
sented the neighborhood. The city proposed to place ten million dollars
in a community betterment fund in exchange for Lindsay's support of
the project.24 2 The betterment plan included a promise to revitalize a
support the idea that the Equal Protection Clause empowers the judiciary to step in on behalf of
minority groups that do not have sufficient protection in the state's decisionmaking bodies. See
Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77 (cited in note 63), citing Paul Freund, The Judicial Process in
Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. Ill. L. Forum 493, 494 (1975).
239. Dick Russell, Environmental Racism, 11 Amicus J. 22, 25 (Natural Resources Defense
Council, Spring 1989).
240. Id. at 25-26. The firm's idea to target lower socioeconomic neighborhoods also may have
rested on the idea that the firm could make the prospect of an incinerator in the neighborhood
sound like beneficial economic development rather than an environmentally undesirable detri-
ment. For further discussion on the perception that minority neighborhoods are politically weak,
see the discussion at notes 223-24 and accompanying text.




local community center and name it after Lindsay's wife. s The repre-
sentative supported the plan, and touted its economic benefits, but
mentioned nothing about the dioxin, heavy metals, and vinyl chloride
the facility would release into the local environment.
44
The South Central example illustrates how an intent-oriented focus
fails to address racist decisionmaking. A court applying an intent analy-
sis would not find an equal protection violation here because the Board
manifested no intent to disadvantage minorities. 24 5 Rather, the Board
intended to construct a facility as quickly as possible to meet the waste
disposal needs of the city. With timeliness in mind, the Board narrowed
its list of potential sites to areas where the residents were not likely to
delay the incinerator's construction with years of litigation and political
maneuvering. The Board chose a lower-class minority neighborhood to
realize its interest in time-efficiency and not to disadvantage lower-class
minorities. Further, the city offered to spend ten million dollars to revi-
talize the depressed community in exchange for agreeing to host the
incinerator, indicating that the city was concerned about the residents'
interests. Therefore, plaintiffs would have difficulty obtaining relief
under an intent-based equal protection analysis.
A court applying the intermediate-level scrutiny approach would
begin, rather than end, its inquiry by noting that the Board chose a
minority community for its disfranchisement. This fact raises suspi-
cions that the residents' interests were not fully considered; other facts
confirm these suspicions. First, the Board knew about the dioxin and
vinyl chloride hazards, but attempted to conceal this knowledge from
the community. The Board did not attempt to inform the community
at all until after the siting proposal was finalized; even then, the Board
243. Id.
244. It is unclear whether Lindsay knew any of this health information, but the Board and
other city official certainly did. The Board also knew that Sweden banned these incinerators in
1984 after studies conducted near four such facilities showed high levels of dioxin present in
human breast milk and local fish. Id. The dioxin and heavy metals present in incinerator ash have
been linked to cancer, soft tissue sarcoma, learning disabilities, congenital defects, and blood, liver,
and kidney disorders. Marilyn A. Fingerhut, et al., Cancer Mortality in Workers Exposed to 2, 3,
7, 8 TetraChlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin, 324 N. Eng. J. Med. 212 (1991); Julienne I. Adler, Comment,
United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 Am. U. L.
Rev. 885, 888 n.21 (1991). While the causal link between dioxin and these diseases is still debated,
see Jeff Bailey, Dueling Studies-How Two Industries Created a Fresh Spin on the Dioxin De-
bate, Wall St. J. Al, A4 (Feb. 20, 1992), well-publicized events like the dioxin-related evacuations
of Times Beach, Missouri and Love Canal, New York at least should have warned the Board that
dioxin was a potential health hazard. See Michael Gough, Dioxin, Agent Orange: The Facts 121-36
(Plenum, 1986) (discussing Times Beach); Health Effects of Toxic Pollution at 305-06 (cited in
note 167) (discussing health injuries at Love Canal).
245. See East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb Cty. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgm't Corp., 482 F.
Supp. 673, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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only consulted an aged representative who seemingly had lost touch
with the community. The Board's dealings with this representative in-
dicate that real representation was lacking. The representative had per-
sonal motives that predisposed him to accept the proposal, and this
personal benefit motivated him to disregard the residents' interests in
health and safety.
The court additionally would take note of the high amounts of di-
oxin and vinyl chloride that the incinerator would release into the local
environment, and of the fact that the Board must have known of these
health risks when it selected this type of incinerator. The court would
ask whether safer models were available given the Board's economic
constraints. Depending on the costs of alternative disposal measures,
the fact that the city was willing to spend ten million dollars on a com-
munity center in the neighborhood might indicate that economic con-
straints might not have been too great.
The South Central siting decision likely did not involve an intent
to disadvantage minorities as much as an intent to avoid political con-
troversy. Nevertheless, one cannot say that the minority neighborhood
was only incidentally affected by the siting decision: the community was
chosen because it had a high minority population. Accordingly, equal
protection relief should be available in this case.
C. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay
In R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,248 residents of a small community in King
and Queen County sought to enjoin the county's board of supervisors
from constructing a proposed landfill near their community. The county
had three existing landfills, none of which conformed to new environ-
mental regulations imposed by the state. The board of supervisors de-
cided that it had to close those sites and develop a new one. 247 Since the
county did not have sufficient funding to do this by itself, it began ne-
gotiating a joint venture with Chesapeake Corporation under which
Chesapeake would build the landfill for its own disposal and the county
would operate it in exchange for free disposal.248 Chesapeake tested the
soil at a 420-acre tract of county land and found it suitable for a land-
fill. Chesapeake eventually decided not to pursue the joint venture, but
offered the tract for sale to the county at $1000 per acre. The county
board entered a purchase option agreement with Chesapeake, rezoned it
for industrial use, and agreed to lease the tract to Browning-Ferris In-
246. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).




dustries, which would construct and operate the landfill.249 Since the
landfill would be near a black church and graveyard, the board in-
structed Browning-Ferris to leave a large buffer zone between the land-
fill and these areas so as to minimize interference.2 50
At trial, the plaintiffs produced evidence of the disproportionate
racial impact the landfill would have, The total population of King and
Queen County was approximately fifty percrent white and fifty percent
black;25' however, the ratio within one-half mile of the proposed site
was nearly two-thirds black to one-third white.252 In addition, twenty-
one black families and five white families lived along the stretch of road
that would carry the extra traffic to the landfill.253 The plaintiffs also
showed that the county had a history of discrimination in landfill siting.
The three existing landfills all were located in areas that were from
95% to 100% black. 54 Furthermore, in 1986, when the King Land Cor-
poration began operating a private landfill in a predominantly white
residential area, the county board of supervisors hired an attorney to
challenge the operation.255
The R.I.S.E. court faithfully adhered to the intent standard as laid
out in Washington and Arlington Heights. The district court found
that the placement of landfills in the county did have a racially dispro-
portionate impact; however, it found that the county's history of dis-
crimination was not sufficient to show that the board's actions were
motivated by discriminatory intent because the board had done nothing
"unusual or suspicious. '25 The district court noted that the county was
operating under financial constraints, that the 420-acre tract already
had been found environmentally suitable for a site, and that the board
listened to residents' concerns and attempted to minimize the landfill's
impact on the surrounding community.2 57 Accordingly, plaintiffs' equal
protection claim was denied.
Under an intermediate-level scrutiny approach, the R.I.S.E. court
likely would have reached the same conclusion, but it would have
looked at additional factors. An intermediate-level scrutiny approach
249. Id. at 1147-48.
250. Id. at 1147.
251. Id. at 1148.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. At least two of these areas were still predominantly black at the time the lawsuit was
brought. Id.
255. Id. at 1148-49. Interestingly, this same attorney later helped the board in its negotia-
tions with Chesapeake. Id. at 1146.
256. Id. at 1149-50. In fact, the court said "the Board appears to have balanced the eco-
nomic, environmental, and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and conscientious man-
ner." Id. at 1150.
257. Id. at 1150.
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would first examine whether there was in fact a substantial dispropor-
tionate racial impact. Two-thirds of those living within one-half mile of
the site were black (thirty-nine people), one-third was white (twenty-
two people). In light of the 50/50 racial ratio in the county as a whole,
25 8
the impact on blacks was disproportionate, but arguably not substan-
tially so. If the court found the disproportional impact issue to be un-
clear, it then would look at previous landfill siting decisions by the
board. In R.I.S.E., the impact from those sites was dramatically dispro-
portionate, and thus the plaintiffs could meet their burden.
259
The court would then examine whether the affected blacks were
fairly represented in the decisionmaking process. Two of the five mem-
bers of the board of supervisors were black. These two were appointed
to act as liaisons to the neighborhood and were asked to investigate
alternatives to the 420-acre site. At every instance, both black repre-
sentatives voted in favor of pursuing this site for the landfill.260 Fur-
thermore, the board informed the public at every step, heard the
concerns of the affected community, and investigated proposed alterna-
tive sites before reaching its decision.2 1 These factors, standing alone,
weigh heavily in favor of a finding of fair representation.
258. The racial character of the county as a whole is important for determining the dispro-
portionate impact issue because the entire county would use, and thus benefit from, the disposal
facilities constructed at the site. In order to determine whether the burdens are disproportionately
distributed along racial lines, therefore, one must look to see how the benefits are distributed. For
example, if the county were 20% black and 80% white, the fact that 66% percent of those affected
by the landfill were black would constitute a more disproportionate impact than existed in the
R.LS.E. case.
Of course, if plaintiffs could show that despite the 50/50 demographic breakdown, whites de-
rived a substantially greater benefit from the landfill than blacks. This should factor into the cal-
culation as well. For example, if commercial establishments generated the majority of waste in the
county, the landfill accepted commercial waste without charge, and most of the county's businesses
were owned by whites, it would seem that a greater benefit from the landfill inures to the county's
whites than blacks. This evidence would lean towards a finding of disparate impact.
259. The R.LS.E. court looked at all sites in the county to determine that a disproportionate
impact existed. See R.LS.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149. It is unclear whether the court found that the
instant siting decision caused a disparate impact by itself.
260. Board members Kay and Alsop, both black, pursued discussions with Chesapeake. Id. at
1146. Further, Alsop moved for the Board to execute the purchase option agreement with Chesa-
peake. Id. Both Alsop and Kay voted in favor of authorizing the landfill and continuing negotia-
tions with Browning-Ferris. Id. at 1147. They also voted in favor of rezoning the tract from an
agricultural to industrial area. Id. at 1148. Finally, Alsop and Kay voted in favor of leasing the
tract to Browning-Ferris to construct and operate a landfill. Id.
261. Many of the decisions involving the site were made at public sessions, and the local
media publicized the location of the proposed landfill site. Id at 1147. Three members of the board
attended a community meeting about the proposed site; the board held a public hearing on the
landfill site, at which Browning-Ferris made a presentation about the operation of a landfill; and
the board investigated an alternative site, proposed by the plaintiffs, but found it environmentally
unsuitable because it was on a slope and a stream ran through the middle of it. Id. at 1147-48.
Incidentally, the proposed alternative site was an area with an 85% black population. Id. at 1148.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Other facts not considered by the district court, however, deserve
close investigation. Two of the three white board members were em-
ployees of the Chesapeake Corporation, which sold the land to the
county,262 and all three white board members had more political experi-
ence than the newly elected black members. 63 Further, it does not seem
that the board ever considered the costs of refurbishing the existing
landfill sites instead of building a new one. From a process perspective,
these facts arouse suspicion. A court using an intermediate-level scru-
tiny approach would examine the dealings between Chesapeake and the
board closely to determine whether the corporatibn offered any per-
sonal incentives to any of the board members, especially the Chesa-
peake employees, to persuade them to approve the 420-acre purchase. If
such incentives were offered, even if legal under state law, the residents'
interests were likely ignored in the decisionmaking process. Also, the
court should examine the relative costs of revising the existing sites to
conform with the new regulations and compare those to .the costs of
purchasing the new tract. In doing so, the court should take into ac-
count the fact that a landfill operation company such as Bronwing-Fer-
ris might agree to bear the costs of construction itself in exchange for
the right to operate the landfill. Assuming these further lines of inquiry
revealed no new information, however, an intermediate-level approach
probably would result in a finding of no equal protection violation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Racial discrimination is not the conscious evil that equal protection
law presumes it to be. Racism is a by-product of cognitive processes
that encourage stereotypes as a shortcut way of understanding new in-
formation. As such, it often operates in a person's unconscious, generat-
ing discrimination without the person consciously intending to
discriminate. Often the person will not even realize she is discriminat-
ing on racial grounds. Therefore, equal protection analysis should not
focus on whether the decisionmakers intended to discriminate, but
whether the decisionmaking process was structured in such a way as to
preordain results that disparately burden blacks.
The proposed intermediate-level scrutiny test would create the
proper focus by examining the amount of actual representation that the
disparately affected group had in the decisionmaking process. Ideally,
the Supreme Court would adopt this approach and expressly renounce
the intent standard. Barring that unlikelihood, the future of equal pro-
262. Id. at 1147.
263. The black board members were chosen in a 1988 special election pursuant to a federal
redistricting order. Id. at 1146.
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tection law lays in the hands of the circuit courts, which can invoke the
intent doctrine in name yet apply the deeper analysis called for in this
Note. The circuit courts have stretched and manipulated the intent test
before26" 4 and circumstances dictate that they should do so again.
Until now, equal protection law has recognized only the most evi-
dent manifestations of racial discrimination. It has remedied only those
injuries in which evidence exists that the decisionmaker intended to
harm a nonwhite because of that person's race. This intent standard
may have been justified in the 1970s; however, current psychological ev-
idence overwhelmingly indicates that intent is hardly a necessary factor
in racial discrimination. The dead hands of Washington and Arlington
Heights do not grasp the notion that racial discrimination may occur
irrespective of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, courts should loosen
the chokehold grip these cases have on equal protection law and adopt
the intermediate-level standard.
Edward Patrick Boyle*
264. See, for example, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 583 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977). See also the discussion in note
128.
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